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SPECIES, HUMANS, AND TRANSFORMATIONS 
ABSTRACT 
 Do biological species have essences? The debate over this question in philosophy 
of biology exhibits fundamental confusion both between and within authors. In What to 
Salvage from the Species Essentialism Debate, I argue that the best way forward is to 
drop the question and its terms in order to make progress on two issues: how to 
individuate species taxa; and how to make sense of changes in explanatory frameworks 
across the Darwinian historical divide. I further argue that a primary motivation for 
anti-essentialism, biological variation, matters differently to each project.    
 Anti-essentialism in the philosophy of biology has inspired influential rejections 
of the idea that there is such a thing as human nature. In More Bark than Bite, I show 
that the arguments are significantly weaker than supposed. Moreover, none of the 
weighty consequences thought to follow from any genuine sense in which there is no 
human nature, actually do follow. The evolution-based denial of human nature has little 
to contribute to inquiries into the human condition, both philosophical and scientific.  
 Decisions about whether to undergo experiences that could change the very 
preference-base on which the choice is made are “transformative”. L. A. Paul argues that 
transformative decisions present a problem for standard decision theory when 
approached in a way that leans on evaluations of the experiential consequences of the 
choices. Her solution proposes that we approach such decisions by asking ourselves how 
much we value the kind of discovery involved in transformative experience. In Shifting  
!iii
Attention on Transformative Choice, I present two problems for her solution and offer 
an alternative. Transformative decisions may be rationally approached by asking 
ourselves how much we judge the activities on the other side of transformation to be 
worthwhile. This proposal helps make better sense of our relationship to experiential 
consequences of transformation, which is more flexible than Paul acknowledges.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 The following introduction may be more biographical than many. But I think it 
necessary given that what I originally envisioned was a traditional monograph-like 
project, and what I ended up with are three papers that I never envisioned writing, only 
two of which are closely connected. The narrative sheds light on the unlikely unity I 
identify at the end of this introduction.    
 My thesis project began as an attempt to build on an idea that came as a big 
surprise to me in graduate school. That idea was the claim that evolutionary theory 
shows us that there is no such thing as human nature. An even bigger surprise was the 
fact that this claim enjoyed a position of orthodoxy in philosophy of biology due to 
advocacy by some of its leading figures. The surprise was congenial, though, as I had 
long felt most affinity toward traditions of thought in philosophy and the human 
sciences that emphasized the plasticity and freedom of human being, as well as the 
autonomy of the sciences of mind and society. Suspicious of E.O. Wilson’s sociobiology 
and more recent evolutionary psychology, I was enthused to learn that the seeds of their 
own refutation lay within their home turf. I was even more encouraged by Peter 
Godfrey-Smith’s conjecture that perhaps a fruitful connection could be found between 
the evolutionary and existentialist denials of human nature. It’s also congenial to my 
mindset to explore unlikely connections between very different lines of thought. So I set 
out to reinforce the evolution-based denial of human nature against common 
misconceptions, and to locate and exploit that hoped for connection.  
 To reinforce the evolutionary denial of human nature, I turned to a recent 
challenge to its argumentative basis. That basis is a more general species anti-
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essentialism in the philosophy of biology. If no species has an essence, then the species 
that humans belong to does not. But Michael Devitt, in “Resurrecting Biological 
Essentialism,” brought a vigorous challenge to the anti-essentialist orthodoxy; one that I 
thought needed answering. If he was right, the primary justification for using 
evolutionary theory to deny that humans have natures was missing. If he could be 
refuted, so much the better for the first aim of my project.  
 I’ve been struggling with Devitt’s arguments, and the reinvigoration of the species 
essentialism debate, ever since. The first paper of my thesis argues for my current take 
on it: that it has no common target for disputants to be right or wrong about. While that 
conclusion rests on an argument about the best way to account for the many different 
positions and lines of argument that have arisen in the debate, Devitt’s paper is a good 
microcosm of what I think plagues the debate as a whole. For while his main arguments 
are convincing for something, it is hard to understand why they are arguments for 
essentialism. And it is telling that his own explicit characterization of what essences are 
do not help us understand any better how his arguments count in favor of them.  
 Devitt’s primary arguments, as I understand them, are that intraspecific variation 
has been exaggerated by philosophers of biology and that the many true generalizations 
about members of species taxa require partial explanation via their genetic causes. I 
agree with him on the first part, and many of his opponents in the debate agree with him 
on the second part (indeed, I don’t know who would dispute it). But for various reasons, 
including the fact that essentialists like Aristotle recognized variation within species, it 
is hard to see how these relatively uncontroversial considerations add up to 
essentialism.  
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 Taking more and more of the recent literature on species essentialism into 
account only reveals more ways of construing essentialism (or mere intuitive appeals to 
it), more ways of arguing for and against it, and more historical traditions appealed to 
for inspiration or motivation. This leads me to conclude that the species essentialism 
debate is beyond repair and should simply be abandoned. However, there are two 
important debates in the vicinity that deserve to be addressed on their own. The first is 
how species taxa are individuated. That they may be individuated is, or should not be, 
controversial. What is controversial is whether intrinsic traits of organisms figure in the 
identity conditions of some species. This is a question that is often treated as one about 
whether species have essences. It shouldn’t be.  
 On the question of whether intrinsic traits of organisms figure in the identity 
conditions of species, one line of resistance comes from the idea that there is too much 
diversity within species to allow it. But profligate diversity in certain traits can coexist 
with uniformity in others. Whether the amount of variation within a species matters to 
its identity conditions is partially dependent on how much, and what kind, of uniformity 
also exists within a species.     
 The second question to be divorced from the anti-essentialism debate is how best 
to understand post-Darwinian changes in biological explanation. Ernst Mayr kickstarted 
this issue by characterizing pre-Darwinian biology as ensconced in “typological” 
thinking and post-Darwinian biology as engaged in “population thinking”. The former 
kind of thinking came to be associated with essentialism, the latter with anti-
essentialism. The key feature of population thinking is that in the right kinds of 
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populations, biological variation may be taken for granted and has a positive 
explanatory role to play in evolutionary processes.  
 The shift to population thinking is misleadingly put in terms of anti-essentialism 
for two reasons. First, while it is incompatible with a strongly normative understanding 
of biological variation typically attributed to Aristotle, it is silent on other issues falling 
under the “essentialism” umbrella. This makes a general attribution of anti-essentialism 
to population thinking too coarse-grained. Furthermore, population thinking has not 
been the only post-Darwinian explanatory innovation. Others have been argued to have 
more affinity to essentialism. Once again, if the repeating comparisons to “essentialism” 
are simply dropped, we may achieve a more balanced and nuanced understanding of 
how biological explanation has advanced in the wake of the Darwinian revolution.  
 We need to make progress on the issue of how organismal traits figure in the 
identity conditions of species taxa. We also need to make progress on understanding 
explanatory strategies in modern biology, and how they differ from their historical 
counterparts. And we need to reevaluate what roles biological uniformity and diversity 
play in those projects. But the use of the essentialism issue as a framework 
encompassing both issues has lost its usefulness. Progress is more likely without it.  
 While my first paper results in an “anti-essentialism” of a sort, it is not one that 
reinforces the evolutionary denial of human nature. If anything, it invites suspicion 
about whether that denial also bares the marks of confusion. That suspicion is deepened 
by the fact that many debates and claims in the human sciences that employ the 
language of “human nature” are not charitably interpreted as committed to any strong 
stance with respect to species essences. For instance, the question of to what extent 
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human psychologies are “nativist” is generally understood as one about human nature. 
And, as I argue, the question is largely orthogonal to the considerations that exercise the 
species essentialism debate.  
 As I acknowledge, it may be true that there is no human nature, if human nature 
is supposed to be equated with a biological species essence of Homo sapiens. But that is 
compatible with many plausible conceptions of human nature, e.g., the set of 
psychological traits driven to fixation by the dawn of what archaeologists call 
“behavioral modernity”, and that continue to be fixated in human populations today. 
Moreover, the fact that there is no human nature in any clear, strong essentialist sense 
does not imply many of the things philosophers of biology have argued for. In particular, 
it does not necessarily imply either ethical conclusions congruent with pro-humanist 
outlooks, or that human biology is irrelevant to ethical or political projects. Nor does it 
suggest radical restructuring of the aims and methods of human psychology and 
anthropology. Nor, finally, are there any interesting connections to be made with other 
philosophical denials of human nature, including existentialism.  
 Of course, by the end of this second paper, I have thoroughly undermined the 
original aims of my thesis project. I have done the opposite of reinforcing the 
evolutionary denial of human nature. And I have argued that there is no interesting 
connection to be found between that denial and the denials found in the writings of 
various existentialists. This left me with a conundrum about what to do next. I hoped to 
extend my results to a specific, substantive conception of human nature. This is the 
conception of humans as the rational animal that has been so influential in the Western 
tradition since at least Aristotle. What lessons might evolutionary theory have for this 
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tradition? Unfortunately, repeated attempts to tackle the issue failed to yield adequate 
progress. I remain interested in the project. But the wide diversity of responses to my 
initial attempts to do something with it suggest to me that the issue is even more vexed 
than the species essentialism one.  
 Fortunately, I found a different, more focused and tractable topic to address: L. 
A. Paul’s work on transformative experience. The topic does not directly relate to the 
arguments and conclusions resulting from the first two papers. But it did allow me to 
work on issues that relate to my motivations for the original project. These motivating 
interests include what, if anything, distinguishes humans from other intelligent 
creatures; and challenges to traditional conceptions of human being as pressed by 
various existentialist thinkers.  
 While it is not an explicit topic of the paper, transformative experience, i.e., 
experience that changes one’s sense of who one is in fundamental ways, is arguably a 
feature unique to human beings. So understanding transformative experience may be 
one path toward getting a grip on what is distinctive of human psychology. The fact that 
it may represent a deep challenge to our understanding of ourselves as rational beings, 
or at least currently influential models of what that means, is also congenial to my 
original motivations. Many existentialists focused on the limits of rationality for making 
sense of humans. So at the end of this project, I am again hopeful for the prospects of 
investigating themes raised by existentialist thinkers through the lens of contemporary 
philosophical methods.  
 That being said, the results of my paper on transformative experience continue 
the theme of denying that the connection to existentialist thought has been adequately 
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located. For I argue that people can and do make rational choices to undergo, or avoid, 
transformative experiences via evaluations of the worthwhileness of the activities that 
the experiences open up to them. The inaccessibility of the phenomenal character of the 
experiences one could have due to transformation is not an impassable obstacle to 
employing rational methods of decision making. But there is a result of my own solution 
that converges with existential themes of commitment and meaning-making. 
Specifically, our commitments to worthwhile pursuits, combined with our ability to 
learn to like or overcome dislike of novel types of experiences, render the character of 
novel phenomenal experience much less important to calculative decision making than 
some (e.g., Paul) may have thought.  
 If there is unity to my thesis project, then, this is how I conceive of it. The first 
two papers may be seen as contributions to the philosophical and scientific frameworks 
in which specific conceptions of human nature are evaluated. The last is a small but 
substantive contribution to understanding what human nature is actually like.            1
!  Thanks to Brook Boardman for helping me meet the formatting requirements1
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WHAT TO SALVAGE FROM THE SPECIES ESSENTIALISM DEBATE 
Introduction 
 Until recently in contemporary philosophy of biology, the acknowledged 
orthodoxy was that species have no essences.  The last fifteen years have seen defenses 2
of a variety of species essentialisms along with responses from the old guard.  I think 3
that species still have no essences, but not because the anti-essentialists are completely 
correct in their arguments nor the essentialists completely wrong in theirs. Rather, there 
is no common target in the debate. The best arguments of both sides are better aimed at 
issues that drop any reference to essences. The two most important such issues are the 
question of how species taxa are individuated, including what role organismal traits 
play; and the question of how best to understand Darwin-inspired changes in 
explanatory frameworks in biology.  It is my aim here to make the case that these two 
issues are best kept distinct from each other, and from any question of essentialism. 
Nothing pertaining to the latter issue has anything to contribute to progress on the 
former two. Rather, attention to the essentialism issue only confuses the genuine issues. 
The idea that there is a clear thesis of species essentialism worth debating is an illusion 
that engenders confusion. 
 It’s quite helpful to my case that the origin of the anti-essentialist orthodoxy is 
not unified on a particular target, but divides between the two issues that I claim should 
!  Hull (1965) and Sober (1980) are the acknowledged sources in philosophy of biology, with 2
Mayr (1975/1959) the main biological inspiration for Sober. 
!  Neo-Essentialists: Boulter (2012), Boyd (1999), Devitt (2008), Dumsday (2010), Griffiths 3
(1999), LaPorte (2004), Okasha (2002), Walsh (2006), Wilson (1999); Counter-
Revolutionaries: Ereshefsky (2010), Lewens (2012), Nanay (2011) Pedroso (2012) Rippiel 
(2010)
!8
be kept distinct. The two acknowledged classics of species anti-essentialism in 
philosophy of biology are Hull’s “The Effect of Essentialism on Taxonomy: Two 
Thousand Years of Stasis” (1965) and Sober’s “Evolution, Population Thinking, and 
Essentialism” (1980), which develops Ernst Mayr’s (1959/1975) distinction between 
“typological” and “population” thinking in a particular direction. Hull’s work exclusively 
focuses on questions of taxa individuation and the definition of the species category. 
Mayr’s distinction plays no role in his arguments, and explanatory issues in biology 
make no contribution. Sober, on the other hand, understands what is worth making 
sense of in Mayr’s distinction in terms of a profound reorientation in how explanation 
works in biology. I will have more to say about the differences between Hull and Sober 
later on. Both papers broach broad, intricate issues. Unfortunately, the two authors’ 
employment of the “essentialism” label traded clarity for rhetorical punch. And this lack 
of clarity has persisted. As my discussion of the current species essentialism literature 
shows, the blending of issues over taxa individuation with issues over changes in 
biological explanation under the banner of species essentialism is a continuing 
stumbling block to achieving clarity and progress on what are distinct issues. Simply 
removing the essentialism issue from the equation can help clear up the confusion.    
Confused Debates  
 When a debate is confused, progress by the usual means is not an option. A 
confused debate won’t be decided by additional evidence, a new counterexample, 
discovery of a position’s undesirable consequences. There is some other kind of obstacle, 
some kind of “intellectual befuddlement", standing in the way. It is hard to say exactly 
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what this means though, as there is more than one way to be confused. Perhaps it is like 
Tolstoy’s insight into unhappy families—each confused debate is confused in its own 
way.  In the case of the species essentialism debate, the confusion results from implicitly 4
assuming that there is a clear and distinct concept of essence that everyone is arguing 
over, when no such common target exists.  
 I plan to show that there is no such shared understanding of what “species 
essentialism” is by examining some of the more influential contributions to the debate. 
The general lines of evidence leading me to this conclusion include: argumentative 
reliance on casual uses of the concept that are discordant with applications of explicit 
characterizations of it; disagreement over whether an agreed upon empirical fact or 
phenomenon counts as an instance of an essence; wide divergence in what authors take 
to be the core issues; failure to acknowledge or address such divergences; a striking 
correlation between number of new entries into the debate and number of new issues 
that are taken to be central ones.  5
 If the debate is as confused as these lines of evidence suggest, the question arises 
of what to do about it. My proposal for overcoming the confusion is to drop the species 
essentialism issue entirely. In recommending this, I do not mean to suggest that there 
are no clear issues being mistaken for the essentialism issue. It is not simply a pseudo-
problem to be dissolved. Rather, there are two important issues in the philosophy of 
biology, more well-defined, that get conflated with the “essentialism” issue. The two 
!  From Anna Karenina: “All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its 4
own way”. 
!  Of course, new entries to a debate should be expected to say something new. But there is a 5
difference between drawing a new distinction, giving a new argument, etc. that are directed at 
what others take to be the central issue; and introducing a new issue that the debate should 
“really” be focused on. 
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issues are what general principles guide species taxa individuation; and what kinds of 
changes and advances in biological explanation come out of the Darwinian 
transformation in biology. Biological variation, often taken as the primary motivation 
for anti-essentialism, actually matters differently to each project. So even the usual 
reason for anti-essentialism is not univocal in what it tells us. “Essentialism” is 
simultaneously too diffuse and too coarse-grained a target for the kinds of 
considerations that really matter to understanding species individuation and advances 
in biological explanation.  
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section three provides the promised 
evidence on the state of the debate. Section four considers options for how to respond to 
the debate and argues against more optimistic ones. Section five argues for what I call a 
Salvaging response by making some suggestions for how the individuation and 
explanation issues mentioned above will look like when unencumbered by “essences”. 
Since the essentialism issue has importance outside of biological species, there may be 
wider consequences for my accusations of confusion beyond philosophy of biology. So in 
section six I offer a speculative diagnosis for the confusion that may have consequences 
for the “psychological essentialism” research program in psychology. I then conclude.        
The Species Essentialism Literature 
 In this section I present evidence that the literature on species essentialism in 
philosophy of biology is deeply confused and confusing. From a bird’s eye point of view, 
the most conspicuous problem is not just a lack of shared understanding of what species 
essentialism is supposed to be, but a diversity of approaches to answering that very 
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question. Many simply assume that the notion is intuitively clear and use “essence”, and 
its cognates, with an implicit presumption of shared understanding (e.g., Griffiths 1999; 
Boyd 1999; Wilson 1999). Some specify functions and commitments of essentialist 
positions (Ereshefsky 2010a, b; Walsh 2006; Okasha 2002). Least often, there is an 
explicit characterization of what essences are supposed to be (Devitt 2008). Often there 
is no attempt to seek continuity with historical essentialisms (Devitt 2008; Boyd 1999; 
Wilson 1999). But when there is, it is not always the same historical tradition that is 
cited (compare LaPorte 2004 and Okasha 2002 with Boulter 2012 and Walsh 2006). 
And there is even appeal to different aspects of historical figures (compare Boulter 2012 
and Walsh 2006). In short, there is far less shared understanding of the issue at stake 
than is noticed or acknowledged.   
 But there is not just unacknowledged diversity across authors. The confusion 
reaches down within authors as well. And this is the most telling sign that there is 
something deeply wrong with the debate. I attempt to show this in detail with three of 
the most important papers in the debate, each arguing for a general position defended 
by others but at odds with the other two. They are Michael Devitt’s (2008) defense of 
“intrinsic essentialism”, Samir Okasha’s (2002) defense of “extrinsic essentialism”, and 
Marc Ereshefsky’s attack on all “new” essentialisms (2010a). The major theme to keep 
track of is the different perspectives on the relevance of individuation and explanation to 
the essentialism debate, and how those differences escape notice. Devitt exhibits 
confusion over the concept of essence by explicitly characterizing it in terms of its 
individuating function and then ignoring that characterization in arguing via appeal to 
intuitive explanatory considerations. Okasha attempts to hive off the individuating 
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function of essentialist positions (from any explanatory ones) and fails to recognize that 
what results is an implausible position that any attempt to individuate amounts to a 
form of essentialism. Ereshefsky explicitly, though insouciantly, recognizes the internal 
diversity of what he groups under his “New Essentialism” label, as well as its profound 
difference from “traditional essentialism”. Yet he also fails to consider that his (rather 
brief) treatment of the diversity of issues present in his assorted group cry out for 
separate, in-depth investigation, distinct from the essentialism issue. 
 Devitt’s primary target is Okasha, and Ereshefsky singles out both for special 
attention. Ereshefsky seems to understand best the importance of both explanatory and 
individuating functions to historical essentialisms (2010a, 683). This comes out in his 
critique of Okasha, which bears similarities to my own. What he fails to recognize, and 
this is representative, is the difficulty in trying to coherently combine those two strands 
in a stable, coherent, and defensible way. This is best shown by engaging with Devitt in 
detail. I turn to that task now, before addressing Okasha and Ereshefsky. Once I get 
through those three, I briefly address other authors to widen the inductive base on 
which I infer the confusion I accuse the debate of.           
Devitt on Essences 
 Offering an explicit definition or characterization of essences does not always 
prevent lapses into appeals to intuitive considerations about what essences are 
supposed to be or do. This is true of Michael Devitt’s paper defending what he calls 
“Intrinsic Biological Essentialism”. In it he provides an explicit and precise 
characterization of what he takes essences to be. But none of his subsequent arguments 
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for species essences appeal to it. Here is his characterization, which he offers without 
argument or defense:  
“A property P is an essential property of being an F iff anything is an F partly 
in virtue of having P. A property P is the essence of being an F iff anything is 
an F in virtue of having P. The essence of being F is the sum of its essential 
properties” (345).  
On this characterization of essence, entities with essences and entities with identity 
conditions are co-extensive. I take individuating conditions to be ones  
That may be a desideratum for a theory of essence. But more needs to be argued if 
essences are simply equated with identity conditions. That F’s have identity conditions 
is or ought to be far less controversial than that F’s have essences. Evidence that Devitt 
is simply equating the two comes from his commentary on the characterization:  
“Essences can be fully intrinsic; for example, the essence of being gold is 
having atomic number 79. Essences can be partly intrinsic and partly extrinsic 
and relational [offers pencils and pens as examples] … essences can be fully 
relational and extrinsic; being Australian is probably an example because it 
seems that anything … can have the property provided it stands in the right 
relation to Australia” (345-6).  
  
Given his list of Australian things (people, buildings, expressions, etc.), Devitt appears 
to hold that just about everything has an essence. This makes one wonder whether 
Devitt is simply equating essences and conditions of individuation. If something exists, I 
take it to be a fairly banal point that it can be given identity conditions of some sort or 
another. But it is not banal to assert that it has an essence. But Devitt never argues that 
all things that have identity conditions also have essences.  
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 What is also absent from his characterization of essences is any mention of 
explanation. Yet an appeal to the supposed explanatory power of essences is the primary 
move in his main argument for them. As he summarizes that argument: “…structural 
explanations in biology demand that kinds have essential properties” (355). But there is 
no argument for why his characterization of essences can provide the kinds of structural 
explanations biology demands.   
The Shift to Explanation 
 “Structural explanations”, for Devitt, refer to the cellular, largely genetic, causal 
contributions to the features of organisms that figure in true generalizations about them 
(347). Such generalizations include ones like African rhinos have two horns and polar 
bears have white fur (351). There is a point in the vicinity of Devitt’s, properly construed, 
that is certainly true. That many non-genetic facts about species taxa have causal 
explanations that appeal to genetic facts about them should not be under dispute. But 
why does this matter to the question of essentialism?  
 Devitt says, with respect to generalizations about tigers having stripes, that: “…
there is something intrinsic…partly in virtue of which the animal is a tiger and which 
causes it to be striped. That something is an essential intrinsic property” (353, emphasis 
added). Again, there is no question that a striped tiger has internal causes, including 
genetic, of its stripedness. But why is the striped entity a tiger “partly in virtue of” that 
fact? His explicit characterization of essences makes no mention of causes. Clearly 
Devitt must be relying on something else besides that characterization here.  
 If Devitt is relying on more than a brute, a priori intuition about what counts as a 
biological kind’s essence, then there must be some principle that bridges his general 
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characterization of essence to the biological realm. He never provides one, however. He 
does make an argument that generalizations like “tigers have stripes” cannot be “brute 
facts” (352). Agreement on that point is why we turn to genetics for (partial) causes. 
What Devitt doesn’t provide though, for instance, is an argument for why stripedness 
cannot, for all its non-bruteness, still itself be part of what makes something a tiger. 
Stripedness is also an intrinsic feature of tigers. Why could it not be part of the essence 
of tigerhood? If Devitt fails to provide a principled way for distinguishing between 
properties that are and are not essential, then he provides no reason why all the 
properties of an entity are not essential to it. But a theory of essences that does not 
distinguish non-essential properties is vacuous.   
 Despite not mentioning it, perhaps Devitt is assuming an essence/accident 
distinction, according to which many intrinsic properties of a kind are “accidental” or 
“non-essential” to it. If so, then perhaps having stripes is not essential to being a tiger. 
Something could be a tiger even if it did not have stripes. The problem with this 
maneuver is that one way for something to not have stripes is for it to lack the genetic 
causes of stripes. But, then, so far as Devitt’s arguments go, something which doesn’t 
have the genetic causes of stripes could still be a tiger and so, by his characterization of 
essences, genetic causes of stripes are not essential properties of tigers.   
 Alternatively, perhaps Devitt supposes that the genetic causes of non-genetic 
traits are “brute” in a way that non-genetic traits are not. Then only “brute”, or perhaps 
better, “fundamental”, features of something are essential to it. If so, we are owed a 
further explanation of what is “fundamental”, why only genetic traits are fundamental, 
and why only fundamental properties can be essential.  
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 However “brute” gets spelled out, the true generalization that tigers have the 
genetic traits that are causally necessary for stripes demands explanation just as much 
as tigers have stripes does. So, by Devitt’s own explanatory demands, it does not pass 
the candidacy requirements for essences. Tigers having stripes-inducing-genetic-
material causally depends on the transmission of genetic material across generations, 
which itself causally depends on the mating activities of tigers. Patterns of mating 
activity in tigers may in turn depend on their stripes (e.g., non-striped tigers don’t mate 
as successfully as striped ones). If not, we know that the visible features of many species 
are causally necessary to the patterns of their mating activities, and so reasoning of the 
exact same form could be made concerning one of them. The point of the reasoning is 
that our drive to understand the unseen proximate causes of tiger stripes does not 
decisively favor them over stripes themselves for what makes something a tiger.  
 To sum up my argument here, Devitt appears to be assuming a model of 
explanation on which the provision of information about the history of causes leading 
up to the explanandum counts as explanation (see Lewis 1986). But such models do not 
assume anything about essences and Devitt has not given any reason why any one part 
of the causal history leading to tigers having stripes is entitled to the honorific essence of 
tiger.  It is true, as Devitt notes, that there are whole bodies of information about 6
regularities concerning tigers that are associated with our tiger-classificatory practices. 
But there is no reason why any subset of that information is uniquely deserving of the 
title “essence”.  
Undermining Intuitions 
!  Thanks to Ned Hall for suggesting this summary of the problem.  6
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 If the previous argument is correct, Devitt has failed to provide a principled 
reason for why genetic material, and not traits like being striped, count as essential 
properties. The argument does depend on the proposition tigers have the genetic traits 
that are causally necessary for stripes, though, and one might point out that, if Devitt is 
right, then the truth that the proposition aims at is better expressed by a theoretical 
identity claim.  Namely, the theoretical identity that tigers are (g1….gn), where g1…..gn 7
denotes a set of genetic properties, including those causally necessary for stripes. But 
that there can be such theoretical identity statements is supposed to be Devitt’s 
conclusion and the point of my arguments above are to show that he has not adequately 
argued for it. Rather, he has assumed such a conclusion by implicit reliance on 
assumptions or intuitions or something that is not part of any explicit theory of essences 
that he offers.  
 If we do appeal to intuitions, Devitt cannot claim victory. While he does not 
restrict essential intrinsic properties to genetics, he does restrict them to properties 
possessed by zygotes (or their “equivalents” for asexual species) [347]. Hence, on his 
view, tiger-zygotes are tigers. But, according to my intuitions, a world in which there are 
duplicates of tiger-zygotes, but there never have been nor ever will be developed tigers, 
is not a world in which there are any tigers. Even if we allow for extrinsic essential 
properties, e.g., genealogical ones, we can imagine a future of our own world, in which 
all developed tigers die out and all that remains (of relevance to tigers) are salvaged 
tiger-zygotes that are somehow preserved by scientists. If I consult my intuitions about 
!  Nothing substantive turns on my use of a generic that may not be universally true. It is not 7
true that all tigers have stripes. But my argument here is aimed at Devitt’s framework even if 
there are universal truths about tigers, e.g., tigers have DNA. This sidesteps his claims that his 
framework can accommodate exceptions. 
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this possibility, I think that something “essential” is missing so that we would then live 
in a world without tigers, though it may be one where it is possible for tigers to return. 
But I only mention all of this for dialectical purposes. I do not think that intuitive 
judgments should decide the matter.  
 My arguments thus far do not rule out any intrinsic properties from being 
essential ones. They only show that Devitt himself has not ruled out any intrinsic 
properties from being essential ones, at least not in a principled way. But no one, it will 
be objected, will want to count all intrinsic traits of organisms of a kind as essential to 
the kind, for surely there can be tigers that have no stripes. My response is that such 
judgments may indeed be reason enough to exclude stripes from the identity conditions 
of tigers. But as I suggested earlier, why would anyone ever deny that tigers have 
identity conditions? To insist that tigers have essences because they have identity 
conditions is to insist on unnecessary metaphysical overlay. It is, I suggest, to be moved 
by an intellectual drive to connect identity and (certain kinds of) explanation to an 
extent that may not be warranted by the actual phenomena (more on this in the last 
section).  
The Failure of Devitt’s Response 
 Toward the end of his paper, Devitt briefly addresses the question of why the 
properties he has in mind are essential properties. He says that if all members of a 
species, S, have some trait, say stripedness, then they also all have the intrinsic trait(s), 
E, that explains stripedness.  Hence, all members of S have E. From here he makes the 8
modal claim that anything that could be a member of S would have E and concludes 
!  Ignoring, again, whether stripedness is actually universal. It is an easy example to use, even if 8
it isn’t strictly universal. Other examples of traits that are universal could be substituted. 
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that E must be an essential property of S, since “that is what it is to be an essential 
property” (378).  
 Note, however, that while Devitt’s explicit characterization of essences entails 
that something has its essential properties wherever it exists (in possibility or 
‘temporality’ space), it does not entail the converse. It does not entail that every property 
something has wherever it exists is an essential property. And that is what Devitt needs 
for the above argument to work. Furthermore, as he claims that the explanatory 
connection between stripedness and E must be law-like, any claim that universal 
properties of a species are essential will not distinguish between stripedness and E qua 
essential properties (376-7). This is a consequence of neither mentioning nor arguing for 
anything about explanation in his characterization of essences.  
 Simply amending his definition is not an option for Devitt, at least not without 
further argument. For instance, it may be true in our toy example that all S’s are striped 
“in virtue of” possessing some intrinsic property E. But that is a causal sense of “in 
virtue of” and it is prima facie not the case that something being an S in virtue of 
possessing property E picks out the same kind of causal relation. We are owed more 
clarification of what the non-causal relation is and why some intrinsic properties and 
not others are candidates for being at one end of it. So granting Devitt his explanatory 
claims really does not get him any closer to his intuitive vision of essentialism.  
 There is a further hurdle for any attempt by Devitt to argue for the essentialism of 
certain intrinsic explanatory properties. He writes that his thesis only establishes that 
species essences are “at least partly” intrinsic, and indicates that he does not wish to 
take issue with the standard view that at least some species are historical entities 
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(346-7). That is, he doesn’t wish to take issue with the idea that organisms sharing 
internal features could belong to different species taxa in virtue of spatiotemporal 
position and inclusion in distantly related lineages.  
 But if Devitt is willing to allow extrinsic or relational properties candidacy for 
essential traits, we also need further argument for why certain potential candidates 
should be ruled out. In particular, he appears not to countenance the environmental 
properties that are just as necessary as intrinsic properties to the development of stripes 
as potential essential properties. And if he is willing to countenance both relational 
properties and explanatory properties, why not relational properties that (help) explain 
what he demands explanation for? I conclude that Devitt has not adequately answered 
the question of why just the traits he singles out are essential properties. His 
identification of intrinsic essential properties of species follows neither from his explicit 
characterization of essences, nor from any arguments he provides. 
 Despite the problems I have highlighted in Devitt’s position and arguments, they 
are not of the sort generally noted in responses to him from defenders of the anti-
essentialist orthodoxy. So far these responses have tried to dispute his interpretation of 
biological facts or scientific practice with respect to the individuation of species 
(Ereshefsky 2010a and Lewens 2012).  This indicates implicit acceptance of his way of 9
construing the whole essentialism issue. I think this highlights a widespread, if tacit and 
largely inchoate, assumption that essentialism has to fit together individuating and 
explanatory components somehow. My engagement with Devitt is meant to show just 
!  Both published and most of those he mentions as personal communication. Only Peter 9
Godfrey-Smith does he mention as challenging him on the “yes, but why essentialism?” front. I 
have tried to show how this line of resistance can be pushed more thoroughly than Devitt 
acknowledges.  
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how difficult actually meeting the demands of that assumption turn out to be. On the 
other hand, if one or the other strand of this essentialist “impulse” is disregarded, it 
becomes extremely dubious whether we continue to have a single debate, much less one 
where “essentialist” terminology and rhetoric contributes rather than detracts. I turn to 
this issue next, in my discussions of Okasha and Ereshefsky.     
Okasha on Essences 
 The divide between Okasha (2002) and Devitt is best introduced by a quote from 
Devitt’s paper that itself quotes Okasha. In the context from which he quotes, Okasha 
denies that there is a genetic property of a species that all members of the species 
possess and all other organisms lack. Here is Devitt, quoting and commenting on what 
Okasha says next:  
“This is not to deny, of course, that there are important genetic similarities 
between members of a single species…species taxa are distinguished by 
clusters of covarying [chromosomal and genetic] traits, not by shared 
essences” (Okasha 2002, 197)”. Great! So the clusters are the essences!! 
[Devitt 2008, 371; original enthusiasm].  
There is, or should be, something suspicious about triumphal metaphysics in the face of 
agreement over the relevant scientific facts. At the very least, this illustrates how 
differently Devitt and Okasha conceive of essences. Although he endorses much of the 
spirit behind the traditional rejection of essentialism, Okasha argues that species have 
extrinsic essences. His arguments also seem to equate essences and individuation 
conditions. He contends:   
“For if we cannot find a set of properties in virtue of which my pet dog Rover 
is a member of Canis Familiaris and not some other species, then how can we 
account for the facticity of assertions like “Rover is a member of Canis 
Familiaris”? Anyone who denied that assertion would presumably just be 
wrong, and we can hardly treat “being a member of Canis Familiaris” as a 
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brute irreducible property that some organisms have and others do not, so 
how can there not be a set of essential properties which define the 
species?” (198-199).  
To my ear, this is a perfectly good argument that species taxa have conditions of 
individuation. Why does Okasha present it as one for essences? He does not say. But he 
does go on to bare his assumption that the two sorts of things are the same while 
arguing for the candidacy of extrinsic properties:  
“For if the essence of a kind is simply supposed to be that set of properties 
which are jointly sufficient and individually necessary for being a member of a 
kind, then there is no particular reason why those properties should be 
required to be intrinsic” (202).  
For Okasha, then, the essence of a kind is simply whatever it is that distinguishes 
members of the kind from non-members. All identity conditions are essences. There are 
not necessarily any special entities, essences, that provide identity conditions. But what, 
we should ask, is the point of equating essences and identity conditions? If essences are 
not something over and above identity conditions, why bring along the historical and 
metaphysical baggage usually associated with them? If everyone would be willing to 
admit that species have identity conditions of some sort or another, why argue further, 
for species essences? Is there any added content to calling them “essences”?  
 These questions become even more pressing once Okasha recognizes both the 
definitional and explanatory strands of essentialism and argues against the latter. He 
targets the Kripke-Putnam revitalization of essences as his foil. And he uses “semantic” 
as a label for identity conditions: 
“Hidden structure” plays both a semantic role and a causal-explanatory role, 
in the Kripke-Putnam story. But there is no a priori reason why the same 
thing should play both of these roles. It is perfectly possible that the extension 
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of a kind term should be determined not by superficial characteristics but by 
“something else” just as Kripke and Putnam say, without it being true that 
that “something else” causally explains the presence of the superficial 
characteristics.” (203).  
Okasha raises a good question about the connection between kind identity and the 
explanation of the kind’s “superficial” characteristics. And he is adamant about the 
answer—soon after the above quote he insists there is no reason at all (not just no a 
priori one) to think that the same thing need play both an individuating and explanatory 
role for a kind. But as Ereshefsky (2010) argues, there is certainly historical reason for 
thinking that if there are essences, then they do work of both kinds: every major 
essentialist since the original, Aristotle, has thought so. Does Okasha think that they 
have all been wrong about the concept of essence? If so, then presumably he thinks 
there is an a priori concept of essence about which we can be substantively right or 
wrong about? If he does think this, then we are due more argument than a simple 
assertion that there is no a priori reason why essences can lack explanatory power. If he 
does not think this, then we are due some scientific reason to posit essences.   
 Okasha’s paper is explicitly an exercise in naturalized metaphysics—biology 
answers, or at least provides the material for answers to, questions about the 
metaphysics of species. So it is curious why he does not go a step further and question 
the essentialism question itself. Biologists certainly don’t explicitly appeal to essences in 
doing their work. A naturalist approach, then, might be understood to recommend 
rejection of the question of essences, as either irrelevant to what science tells us about 
the world, or as unnecessary metaphysical gloss.  
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 More importantly, though, the question of essences is a distraction from an 
important issue. The focus of Okasha’s arguments for relational essentialism are on why 
relations can be essential properties. Otherwise, he rehearses others’ reasons for why 
species taxa are determined by features of lineages rather than intrinsic traits of 
organisms. But he seems to assume that either intrinsic properties must be sufficient for 
species individuation or that extrinsic properties are sufficient. For he does not consider 
the possibility of combinations of intrinsic and extrinsic properties being necessary to 
do all the individuating work. He should have, because there are troubles for a purely 
extrinsic approach to individuating species.  
 The noble gases do not form the basis for life the way that carbon, hydrogen, 
oxygen, nitrogen, etc. do. This is because they cannot enter into the right kinds of 
relations with other elements. And they cannot do so because of certain intrinsic 
features they have. They may be related to the predominant elements of life in all kinds 
of ways. But they aren’t related to them in the biochemical ways necessary for life. 
Certain intrinsic features of elements are necessary to be able to enter into biochemical 
relationships. Similarly for organisms on Earth and their relations of descent. Not just 
any relation counts as a relation of descent and not just any entity can enter in to such 
relations. Intrinsic properties of things matter to which ones can can be related to each 
other as biological “parents” and “offspring”. If this is so, then relations of descent are 
not all that matter to individuating species.  
 The above issue and line of reasoning are not really considered by either Okasha 
or Devitt, or by others in the essentialism literature.  My suspicion is that this is due to 10
!  Devitt’s arguments for intrinsic essences focuses on the explanation of “superficial” features 10
of organisms
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focus on the essentialism issue rather than the issue of individuation as such. The 
former issue is too much of a distraction.  Another place where important issues get 11
glossed over too quickly due to concern with anything calling itself “essentialist” is in 
Marc Ereshefsky’s paper against what he labels the “New Essentialism”. 
Ereshefsky Against “New” Essences 
 We have just seen that Okasha and Devitt fundamentally diverge over what 
essentialism amounts to, despite their explicit focus on just its individuating function. 
Other defenders of various “essentialisms” have further differences with each. In 
“What’s Wrong With the New Biological Essentialism”, Marc Ereshefsky undertakes to 
quash each new outcropping of essentialism, due to the fact that “they (all) concur that 
biological taxa have essences” (674).  But Ereshefsky himself offers a reason to consider 12
a possibility he doesn’t, which is the possibility that this is concurrence in label only: “As 
we shall see, each form of the new biological essentialism rejects one or more … features 
of traditional essentialism” (675 ft. 1).  
 As a general rule, if position X rejects core features of position Y, we either 
shouldn’t understand X as a version of Y, or we should demand some reason for why we 
should understand X as a version of Y. Using the label “Y” is not usually a sufficient 
reason to do so. As Ereshefsky also notes that each “essentialist” position differs over 
both the nature of, and reasons for, essentialism, it seems like he should consider the 
option that distinct issues are being artificially grouped under the same heading in the 
!  Although the issue also doesn’t seem to be addressed in general defenses of the lineage 11
conception of species, as in de Quieroz 1999. 
!  Ereshefsky’s targets include: Griffiths, Boyd, Devitt, LaPorte, Okasha, and Wilson. But not, 12
for instance, Walsh. 
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guise of one determinate position. Since the positions he considers all differ over 
fundamentals, his own arguments are correspondingly diverse, raising the question 
whether he is defending a clear anti-essentialist position, or reacting to labels.    
 In fact, Ereshefsky’s article broaches several different issues in cursory manner, 
each deserving of independent, and more thorough, hearing. These issues include: 
whether arguments usually considered by philosophers can overturn common scientific 
practice (676); whether intrinsic traits do, as a matter of fact, figure in common 
biological classificatory practices (ibid); whether or not the kind/individual distinction 
matters to the ontological status of the species category (678-9); how traits get explained 
(680); how taxon membership is determined (680-682); whether species essences can 
partially overlap (see 680); whether essences are supposed to do explanatory work 
(682-3); the role of history in determining what an essentialist position must amount to 
(683); and more besides.  
 The way I read Ereshefsky’s paper, it serves as an impressive exhibition of 
evidence that there are persistent and important questions about how to understand 
species which consistently get huddled together under “the” essentialism problem. None 
receive adequate treatment in their own right. Each of the issues just listed makes 
repeated appearance in the species essentialism literature, though all are not touched on 
in every paper. Some papers focus on some of the issues, others on others. So there is 
not even agreement in the literature on what is relevant to the species essentialism 
issue, let alone what the most important issues are. The problem is just further 
compounded when we turn to additional contributions to the debate not addressed by 
Devitt, Okasha, Ereshefsky, or their primary interlocutors.  
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More Cooks in the Kitchen 
 Other contributors to the debate have a wider historical lens on the matter, but 
end up adding even further complications. Nanay (2011) understands the species 
essentialism issue as part of the epic historical struggle between “Realism” and 
“Nominalism”. On the one hand, he rightly suggests that many of the considerations 
appealed to in the species debates are neither strong nor general enough to decide that 
issue. But, appealing to Ereshefsky’s (2010) list of features of essentialism, he argues 
that there is one which evolutionary biology denies. It denies a commitment to 
explanation that makes appeal to biological properties Realistically understood. He 
argues for an interpretation of population thinking on which it makes “trope 
nominalistic” explanations available to biology (see 181). And this is the sense in which 
there can be an anti-essentialism unique to biological species that avoids the larger 
historical debate.  
 I’m not sure I fully understand Nanay’s claims, or his arguments for them. They 
appear to rely on some kind of argument that there is a lack of appeal to certain kinds of 
generalizations in making biological explanations (see 185-190). They also depend on 
the explicitly nominalistic strand in Mayr’s (159/1975) own construal of population 
thinking. But it has been shown that there was more than one strand of thought in 
Mayr’s notion of population thinking, and that he was not always internally consistent 
(Hey 2011). Sober’s (1980) pro-population thinking and anti-essentialist arguments 
rested on dismissing Mayr’s nominalistic tendencies and bringing out what is important 
about populations conceived of as entities in their own right—one’s about which causal-
explanatory generalizations are made.  
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 Whether Nanay or Sober are right about population thinking, Walsh (2006) 
would argue that both are wrong about the completeness of population thinking to our 
understanding of evolution. He argues that population thinking leaves out the crucial 
role of the organism in mediating the phenomena covered by traditional population 
biology (changes in gene frequency), and that this is the lesson of recent “evo-devo” 
thinking (see esp. 436-442). Simplifying: recent developmental biology has discovered 
that organismal development is surprisingly robust against many kinds of disturbances 
and Walsh interprets this result as both necessary to the explanation of adaptive 
evolution and as sufficiently similar to Aristotle’s understanding of organisms to inherit 
his mantle. This latter part comes from the idea that Aristotle understood organisms as 
having a form that it was their telos to realize. This telos is their essence (see 427-430).  
 Walsh’s sensitivity to historical matters shows that, for instance, what Ereshefsky 
(2001; 2010) attributes to traditional essentialism was not actually held by figures such 
as Aristotle, and so anti-essentialist considerations of species evolvability, stability, 
variation, vagueness, etc. miss their mark (interpreted as an Aristotelian mark). He does 
think that Aristotle demanded essences be of a simple, unified sort and so denies that 
certain “essentialisms”, e.g. Boyd’s (1999) and Devitt’s (2008), really are such (see 427, 
and ft.4). But developmental biology, he argues, has reconfirmed Aristotle’s simple 
essences via robust development of organisms.  
 Here is not the place to address all of Walsh’s arguments. My own questions for 
him include why robustness needs to be interpreted in the heavily teleological manner 
that he wants to interpret it in. I also don’t think that the robustness that in fact exists 
can do nearly as much of the explanatory work that Aristotle’s telos’s were meant to do. 
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To hold that a certain kind of population thinking is crucial but not complete, as he 
does, is not a sufficient basis for reintroducing a mode of thinking that was totally blind 
to population thinking. In addition, Dumsday (2010) takes up and defends the cause of 
complex essences. So the simplicity versus the complexity of essences adds yet another 
issue to the mix.  
 Finally, Boulter (2012) argues that evolutionary theory must presuppose 
Aristotelian essentialism. He does so on the basis of the fact that both Darwinists and 
Aristotelians are committed to the reality of change, and Aristotelianism, apparently, 
remains the best account of how there can be changes in something that remains the 
same thing. He justifies this move by highlighting a few of the confusions in the 
literature I have noted and arguing that the best way to overcome them is via return to 
shared “first principles” (see p. 94).  
 So to add to the issues identified in the debate running through Devitt, Okasha, 
and Ereshefsky, we also have: Realism vs. Nominalism; how to understand the 
explanatory power of population thinking; the “return of the organism” to biology ; 13
whether said return should be interpreted teleologically; whether essences must be 
simple; and Aristotle vs. Parmenides.    14
 Debates presume disagreement. But they also rely on some shared understanding 
of the issues involved. I submit that the evidence from the species essentialism literature 
amounts to a compelling case that too many of the bases for shared understanding are 
!  I owe the phrase to Nicholson (2014), without necessarily endorsing all aspects of the paper. 13
!  Rieppiel (2010) reveals even further issues and problems with the diverse motivations behind 14
the variety of positions grouped under the “new essentialism” label. His paper has an anti-
essentialist tone, but no unambiguous anti-essentialist conclusion. He also presumes the kind of 
unity in the original anti-essentialist consensus that I denied in the introduction and return to in 
a later section 
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missing for progress to be possible. There is not enough agreement on: what essences 
are supposed to be; what the relevant biological considerations are; how the potentially 
relevant biological considerations are to be interpreted. And since there is so much 
unresolved under each of those three headings, the absolutely crucial issue of how the 
biological considerations are supposed to bear on the essentialism question is a 
currently intractable problem. I turn next to what to do about it.   
Responding to Confusion 
 Consider the following two ways of responding to the state of the species 
essentialism (SE) debate. Hopeful respondents think that the question of whether 
species have essences has a determinate answer and the debate is somehow decidable. 
The way of Despair denies this.  
 The way of Hope assumes that there is a clear, coherent, and non-trivial 
conception of essence. As a matter of minimal charity to the debate thus far, the way of 
Hope must also grant that this conception is not prima facie obviously applicable to 
biological species. It will take significant argument to decide either way. Hopefuls can 
regard the debate I have presented in one of two ways. They can decide that the current 
confusion is real but that there was a point at which the debate “went off the 
rails” (perhaps from the start) and we can return to that point and fix it. The other 
option decides that the confusion I have been documenting is only apparent or 
superficial. With the correct understanding of essence in hand as a hermeneutical key, 
we will come to see just how close everyone really is to solving the problem. Call these 
options Repair and Revelation, respectively.  
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 The way of Despair takes the documented confusion as sufficient evidence that 
there is something wrong with the question of whether species have essences. Most 
likely, there is no clear, coherent, and non-trivial conception of essence for species to 
possess. So this way embraces anti-essentialism of a sort, but not for reasons specific to 
biology or the metaphysics of species. Rather, the whole debate has been a disastrous 
chase down a rabbit hole—disastrous due to its waste of time and talent on a 
pseudoproblem. Despair would agree with Repair that the debate went off the rails at 
some point (definitely from the start), but not because the debaters failed to correctly 
characterize essences. For there is nothing there to be correct or incorrect about.   
 I think that Hope, in both its guises, is probably wrong. But I don’t think Despair 
is entirely correct. I think there probably isn’t any coherent conception of essence worth 
arguing over. But I don’t think there aren’t any lessons to learn from the debate, or that 
there aren’t well-defined questions in the vicinity to be answered. Instead, I think that 
good questions can be Salvaged and approached afresh, sans distracting concern over 
essentialism. The way to Salvage requires holding, against the voice of Despair, that 
there are some important recurring threads of argumentation in the debate that 
significantly track something(s). Simultaneously, it requires denying that what is 
tracked are the essences held out for by the voice of Hope.      
 The best way to argue for Salvage over Despair is to actually pick out the 
important threads of argument and articulate the open questions that they are best 
directed at. This, along with indicating that there may be better, non-essentialist 
arguments for addressing the questions, provides some reason against Hope. But 
denying Hope amounts to a negative existential (no non-trivial and coherent concepts of 
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essence!), which is notoriously tricky to argue for. So let me approach the path of 
Salvaging by saying a bit more about why I reject Hope, in either of its guises.  
Against Hope 
 Both contemporary metaphysicians and historians of philosophy could justly 
complain that most participants in the debate over species essentialism do not 
adequately avail themselves of the resources available to get clear about the notion of 
essence. But only convinced advocates of one or other of the many competing positions 
on what essences are could honestly say that taking all those resources into account 
lends Hope.  
 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) entry on “Essential vs. Accidental 
Properties” acknowledges three competing ways of drawing the distinction in the 
current literature, all of which are extensionally inequivalent to each other (Robertson 
and Atkins 2013). What gets labeled the “modal” approach is inspired most by Kripke’s 
and Putnam’s work on reference from the 70’s. That is also the work often cited by 
various “new” essentialists (esp. Okasha 2002 and Laporte 2004). The attitude usually 
seems to be that new developments in the metaphysics of essence prompt re-
examination of the issue with respect to species (ibid). The problem with this move is 
that neither Kripke (1980/1972) nor Putnam (1975, 1970) explicitly adopt a particular 
conception of essence from history, nor propose one of their own. Instead they employ 
“essence” under a presumption of shared understanding. Putnam (1975, 1970) even 
usually puts it in scare quotes to signal noncommittal use of the word. This has been 
noted by new advocates of what the entry calls “definitional” approaches to the 
distinction who argue that the Kripke-Putnam approach to essence does not pick out 
!33
what many historical philosophers thought essences were (Fine 1993, Charles 2003, 
Oderberg 2008).  
 The “explanatory” approach to drawing the essence/accident distinction is the 
third one mentioned by the SEP article, with Gorman (2005) cited as its most recent 
defender. This approach treats something’s essence as its most fundamental explanatory 
properties, but without claiming that such properties are “definitional”. Although the 
advocates of the definitional and explanatory approaches are not usually cited or 
appealed to in the species essentialism literature, one might think its (the literature’s) 
diversity of emphases are reflected in the three different kinds of essentialism noted by 
the SEP article. If true, that doesn’t lend much hope for progress in the debate. As the 
authors of the article say: “It is not clear whether these three characterizations should 
properly be thought of as competing characterizations of a single notion or instead as 
ways of trying to capture three related, but different … notions” (Roberston and Atkins 
2013). The authors go on to say that they will focus almost entirely on the modal 
characterization for no other reason than historical inertia of 50 years in the analytic 
tradition. If this is the state of essentialism in contemporary metaphysics at large, it 
doesn’t bode well for sorting out the species essentialism confusion. For, at best, the 
latter just reproduces the current unclarity and disagreement in the issue present in the 
former.        
 Given the current unclarity in determining what essences are, a good idea might 
be to turn to history for Hope in sorting out the issues. The trouble with turning to 
history for Hope is that the troubling controversy does not cease. For instance, in the 
turn from the scholastic to the modern period, Locke complained that the scholastics 
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had distorted Aristotle’s conception of essence and was in turn criticized by Leibniz over 
his attempt to distinguish real and nominal essences (see Atherton 2007). But there is 
no doubt that Locke’s microstructural real essences are shorn of many Aristotelian 
features of essences (e.g., natural teleology). Many of today’s advocates of definitional 
accounts of essences advocate some kind of return to Aristotle’s conception. He was, 
after all, the one to coin the Greek neologism that comes down to us as “essence”. 
 When we come to Aristotle, I am not prepared to argue he had an incoherent 
conception of essence. But that doesn’t automatically mean that Hope has found its 
fulfillment by returning to his conception. First, our theme continues: there remains 
scholarly controversy over just what Aristotle’s conception is. Second, a literal 
appropriation of Aristotle’s conception in all its detail is surely false of biological 
species.  There is evidence that Aristotle couldn’t make his conception work even for 15
the empirical biological facts that he was aware of (see Charles 2003). The route of 
appropriating Aristotle will have to slog through the controversy of what is sufficiently 
similar to him to count as anchored to his conception so as not to amount to a new 
invention tailored to fit what we now know about biological species. Hope has its work 
cut out. And a long road to travel before reaching genuinely biological issues again.   
 Finally, the rationalist will hold out Hope for the eventual discovery of the true 
contours of the a priori concept of essence. But there is no reason for the naturalistically 
inclined philosopher of biology trying to progress on the metaphysics of species via 
making sense of the Darwinian transformation of biology to await this discovery. Hence, 
I do not take the case against the viability of Hope to be demonstrative. But there are 
!  Darwin’s advance was not necessary to show this much.15
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considerable obstacles to its success that may not be worth pursuing, especially if a 
Salvaging project can be made attractive. 
A Salvaging Project 
 A Salvaging project that rejects the essentialism issue could take a number of 
directions. It could reaffirm the genuine insights of the original anti-essentialist 
orthodoxy. It could favor some aspect of the neo-essentialist revival. My version aims at 
bringing questions to the fore. What debates can be refocused once concern for 
essentialism is gone? In the introduction, I focused on the questions of species 
individuation and how explanatory frameworks have changed in the history of biology. I 
develop that line of thought further in this section.  
 As a primer for how these issues can be clarified consider: insofar as purely 
lineage based conceptions of species gain favor or additional support from the belief that 
alternatives aren’t viable due to essentialist entanglements, we can cast that worry aside. 
In the end, I do think that the distribution of organismal traits matters to the 
individuation of species, but the route to making that case involves raising questions of 
how we think about variation both within and across species. Biological variation 
ultimately has different roles to play in questions of explanation and questions of 
species individuation. Being able to distinguish them is one thing that may be usefully 
salvaged from the essentialism debate.        
Anti-Essentialist Origins 
 Salvaging distinct pieces from a complicated situation with interlocking parts is 
difficult business. Finding a place to begin can be frustrating. In this case, history gives 
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us a guide. For the essentialist orthodoxy was never actually the result of one, unified 
line of thinking. There are two distinct strands: one tracing to David Hull’s “The Effect 
of Essentialism on Taxonomy: Two Thousand Years of Stasis”; and one tracing to Ernst 
Mayr’s (1975/1959) distinction between typological and population thinking, especially 
as developed in Eliot Sober’s “Evolution, Population Thinking, and Essentialism”. Each 
strand gave rise to different ways of rejecting essentialism. I’ll refer to the traditions 
begun by each as the “Hull-strand” and the “Mayr/Sober-strand”.  They could also 16
respectively be referred to as the “individuation-strand” and the “explanatory-strand”. 
They have important differences as well as commonalities, which I turn to next.  
 As his title hints, the Hull-strand is exclusively concerned with questions about 
the individuation of species taxa, and the nature of the species category. That initial 
paper highlights the difficulties that taxonomists had producing necessary and sufficient 
criteria for taxa membership, arguing that the continued quest to do so must be an 
unfortunate consequence of essentialist thinking. The quixotic nature of the quest, it 
was claimed, had to do with the overwhelming amount of variety to be found within 
species. The diversity of intrinsic traits within species was supposed to show that they 
could not be appealed to in order to draw species boundaries. His influential view of 
species as individuals wasn’t developed until later, but it helped spark the idea that taxa 
membership could not be determined via the intrinsic traits of organisms. Instead, it is 
determined via relational properties, i.e., the relations of descent necessary for inclusion 
in a lineage.  
!  It’s not that Hull doesn’t also cite Mayr. But Mayr is one of many biologists appealed to and 16
for different reasons than the population thinking that Sober latches on to. 
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 The Mayr-Sober strand is focused on explanation rather than individuation.  It 17
joins the Hull-strand in taking there to be something very significant about biological 
variation, but differs in what the significance is. For the Mayr-Sober strand, variation 
has explanatory power that is unrecognized by the “Aristotelian” tradition. Properly 
understanding this requires significant restructuring of our biological explanatory 
framework. Intraspecific variation moves from explanandum in the “Aristotelian” world 
to explanans in the world of population biology. Consequently, statistical norms and 
stereotypes lose any telic or normative explanatory power and become explananda 
themselves.   18
 Now note that these separate strands behind the anti-essentialist orthodoxy, that 
understand the significance of variation differently, represent the two major trouble-
causing threads in the current debate as I presented it above. For instance, recall that 
Devitt characterizes essences in individuating terms and then subsequently argues by 
appeal to explanatory intuitions. Okasha recognizes that essentialist views have included 
individuating and explanatory aspects, but simply dismisses the latter to focus on the 
former. The first major lesson I want to salvage from the debate, then, is that 
outstanding philosophical controversy and questions regarding species individuation 
should be addressed separately from questions of population thinking-based 
explanation. Secondly, both topics should be addressed without regard for the 
essentialism issue. The bulk of my discussion will focus on the individuation issue.  
!  In fact, Sober criticizes the approach of using variation to discredit essentialism. Aristotle, he 17
noted, was fully aware of the need to accommodate such in his account of biological kinds. 
!  This is not to say that variation is not also an explanandum. Rather it becomes an 18
explanandum for another kind of explanans (e.g., microbiological). 
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Individuating Species Taxa 
 Devitt and Okasha agree on this much: that we need to answer the question of 
why organisms belong to the species taxa that they do. As Okasha put it, it cannot be a 
brute fact that Rover belongs to Canis familiaris. What they disagree over is whether to 
answer the question by appeal to extrinsic or intrinsic essences. It should be clear by 
now, though, that we can and should ask the question in a different way. I suggest: are 
intrinsic traits of organisms ever among the individuating features of species taxa? The 
answer can now be pursued without concern for whether we are meeting any essentialist 
strictures. I agree with Devitt that a purely extrinsic approach to species individuation 
isn’t feasible, but for non-essentialist reasons. But getting to my own reasons requires 
exploring some of the issues behind the debate.  
 If someone asked me whether my pet Rover was a dog, I would direct her 
attention to Rover’s morphological features, i.e., to traits intrinsic to Rover. Of course, 
there is much more to the story about why Rover is a dog. But surely, one might think, 
intrinsic traits must be part of it. How could anyone think otherwise? A typical reply is 
that an organism exactly like Rover in all intrinsic respects, but born of a lineage from a 
different planet would belong to a different species than Canis familiaris. Rover is a 
dog, a member of Canis familiaris, in virtue of being born within the spatiotemporally 
localized lineage that is Canis familiaris.  
 Surely that can’t be the whole story, one wants to say. Both Rover and his 
hypothesized doppleganger belong to dog-like lineages and that must be a matter of 
similarity of intrinsic traits. This is where the defender of the lineage conception will 
appeal to the open-ended nature of what can arise in a lineage. Not everything that 
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appears in the Canis familiars lineage need look much at all like Rover. Similarly, 
Rover’s doppleganger need not appear in a lineage very much at all like Canis 
familiaris. Furthermore, the appearance of one, or many, novel “varieties” in a lineage 
does not necessarily create a new lineage. And without a new lineage to belong to, such 
novel organisms only have the lineages they arose in to belong to. Rover owes his 
“doghood" to his parents alone, and can claim no contribution from his own intrinsic 
features.  
 In reply to this line of reasoning, the champion of intrinsic traits will now 
demand to know how lineages get distinguished, and rightly so. For the “I owe it all to 
my parents” approach makes every living thing part of the same lineage going back to 
Earth’s initial organism. One proposal is that lineages are distinguished, at least in part, 
by the composition of intrinsic traits internal to them. Rover may belong to Canis 
familiaris due to parentage, but Canis familiaris is to be distinguished from, say, Canis 
lupus because of differences in traits of the organisms belonging to the two lineages. 
Hence, it is no accident that Rover has traits found in Canis familiaris and not Canis 
lupus.  
 At this point we come to an odd but intriguing disagreement between proponents 
of purely extrinsic criteria for species membership and their opponents (“trait 
proponents”). It concerns the nature and amount of diversity within species. There is a 
long standing tradition among lineage proponents, going back at least to Hull’s classic 
paper, of denying that there is anything near the amount of requisite unity of traits 
internal to a species to distinguish them in intrinsic trait-terms. The reason often 
offered is the apparent failure of biologists to actually come up with adequate lists of 
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intrinsic traits that genuinely distinguish species (Hull 1965; Sterelny and Griffiths 
1999). Indeed, so-called phenetic approaches to species individuation that proceed by 
seeking to establish similarity metrics are widely perceived as failures, including within 
many parts of biology (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999; Lewens 2012b).  
 This idea that there is so much internal diversity is now so taken for granted 
among some that extreme claims are sometimes made without appeal to biological 
evidence. Prior to calling exaggeration, Devitt quotes Okasha as claiming that the 
mechanics of sexual reproduction “ensure an almost unlimited variety in the range of 
possible genotypes that the members of a sexually reproducing species can 
exemplify” (Okasha 2002, 196). And this is a common sentiment expressed by many 
(see Devitt 2008, 370 for more examples).  
 Devitt goes on to complain that surely this must be an exaggeration, though I 
think there is more to say than he does about why. It does seem bizarre to claim that 
there is that much (unlimited!?) diversity internal to species, and it is worth saying 
something about why. It is usually not said how such diversity is measured. And this is 
crucially important because depending on how we classify and quantify diversity, an 
enormous amount of diversity is completely consistent with a large amount of 
uniformity; or, with low but genuine amounts of uniformity that are nevertheless 
causally necessary for the maintenance of the diversity as diversity within one species. 
Taking a wider view of things can help bring these points into focus.   
 Consider amoebas, pine trees, ants, and elephants. All instances of each share 
some biological traits—mostly genetic and cellular. If we eliminate amoebas from the 
group we get even more in common, including some extracellular traits (e.g., multi-
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cellularity, sexual reproduction). The list of universal traits continues to increase 
dramatically as we eliminate types of organisms from our group. Importantly, this is 
true even when we get to just ants, many species of which have many more polymorphic 
types internal to them than most other species. Yet, within an ant species, queens will 
have more biological traits in common with workers than they will with any elephants. 
Whatever diversity there is within an ant species, it must be compatible with this 
seemingly obvious fact. Whatever diversity arises within an ant species, it won’t be of 
the kind or degree characterizing our initial group that included amoebas and pines. 
And whatever diversity there is within elephant species, it certainly doesn’t seem like it 
rises to the level found within species containing the number of polymorphs 
characteristic of many ant species.   
 Nor is the above simple armchair pronouncements on biology. As has been 
recently noted in the philosophical literature, pheneticism is not dead in biology, but 
alive and well, including for sexual species (Lewens 2012). If this is all so, what would 
prompt the kind of exaggerated assertions about intraspecific diversity so common in 
philosophy of biology? One reason may be fear of essentialism. Species anti-essentialism 
has always accompanied philosophical appreciation for the importance of variation in 
biology. But “the importance of variation” can mean different things, as we see in the 
Mayr-Sober strand of anti-essentialism. Its “importance” need not be compromised by 
admitting that it has its limits within species.  
 But if we can agree that the essentialism issue need no longer be a concern, we 
can approach the issue of intra-specific diversity afresh. For clearly there are puzzles 
here. It is true that various phenetic projects of the past have not attained their aims. 
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There aren’t always simple ways of saying how intrinsic traits distinguish closely related 
species. And new species d0 arise, gradually, from old ones. Wilson, Barker, and 
Brigandt (2007) nicely bring out the “intrinsic heterogeneity” of species and the need to 
capture their simultaneous “integrity” and “flexibility”. I think this speaks to the fact 
that we need more tools for talking about diversity. Does diversity come in kinds or 
merely degrees? What kind of diversity matters to species individuation and what 
doesn’t? In the next section I would like to offer a way of talking about variation that 
may help the debate.       
Types of Variation 
 Social insects such as ants are well-known, paradigmatic cases of species with 
several polymorphs. But the kind of diversity in an ant colony due to characteristics 
fundamentally distinguishing queens and soldiers seems different in kind from the sort 
of diversity that distinguishes individual cheetahs by each’s top sprinting speed. 
Roughly, one is diversity in type whereas the other is diversity on a continuous scale. To 
distinguish these kinds of diversity, I introduce the categories of stable variation and 
schmear variation. The category of stable variation is meant to cover reliably recurring 
variations that may often be thought of as sub-types of some larger classificatory unit. I 
have in mind at least polymorphisms in species, developmental stages of organisms, and 
alternating generations. Other kinds of phenomena may fall under this category as well. 
The category of schmear variation is meant to cover at least the ongoing, often random, 
generation of gradual variation that can be well illustrated by traits measurable on 
continuous scales (e.g., height). But it need not be limited to such.  I take both kinds of 
variation to intersect, but not necessarily coincide, with heritable variation. 
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 We can use these categories to think more clearly about what threat variation 
poses to individuation of species via intrinsic traits. For instance, suppose we said that 
to be an ant of a certain species is to be a schmear variant of one of its stable variants, 
where these are a matter of intrinsic traits? Or consider stereotypical traits of creatures 
that we might want to use to individuate their species. Suppose someone proposed to 
individuate Giraffa camelopardalis by its members’ long necks. There will be a 
significant amount of schmear variation with respect to the length of their necks. Does 
this kind of variation rule neck length out as an individuating feature? Not necessarily. 
We could propose, instead, that to be a member of Giraffa camelopardalis is to be a 
schmear variant with a neck length falling within a specified range. The fact that all 
giraffe necks fall within a certain range is most likely a function of the history of 
selection pressures they faced. And creatures with necks falling outside of that range 
also have compensatory differences elsewhere in their anatomies and physiologies. So it 
may be quite informative to characterize them in that way.  
 Another proposal from this way of thinking about variation is that, at least in 
some cases, once schmear variation reaches a certain point, we may have a novel stable 
variant. Schmear variation can only go so far before it turns into something different 
and requires accompanying changes elsewhere in the system to accommodate its 
structural demands or facilitate its new functions. If giraffes began to face selection 
pressures for even longer necks than their current upper limits, they would need to 
evolve further skeletal and physiological changes to accommodate them, eventually 
resulting in a new species (of giraffe?) or perhaps a new polymorph within the same 
species.        
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 I have used fairly simple examples here to illustrate advantages of my approach 
to variation for making it a more tractable issue to think about. But I see no reason in 
principle why my categories couldn’t be extended to talk about more complex or non-
obvious examples of variation throughout the biological realm. Perhaps further 
categories of variation are needed to cover the different kinds. But in offering a way to 
think about them so that variation as we find it need not be the death knell of intrinsic 
individuation of species taxa, I present a challenge to pure lineage conceptions of 
species. It is: be more specific and find a kind of variation that cannot be accommodated 
by what I have offered here, and in a way that genuinely threatens intrinsic 
individuation. Otherwise, appeals to variation should no longer count against it. Stable 
and schmear variation, of the sort that actually obtain in Earthly biology, can both be 
accommodated by intrinsic trait approaches to species individuation in ways motivated 
by evolutionary and developmental biology.  
 That is my claim, anyway. I realize that a stronger case would need to be made, 
one that includes a proposal for exactly how intrinsic traits should figure in the 
individuation of (perhaps only some) species. What motivates re-examination of the 
issue are strong, yet non-essentialist reasons why purely lineage-based views of species 
are wrong. The main reason is that they are under informative. They do not distinguish 
species from other biological lineages (e.g., genes, cells, etc.). Nor do they distinguish 
the species we are familiar with from possible species: those that are even more uniform 
than most Earthly ones, or ones that are far more internally diverse. Purely lineage-
based conceptions of species fail to distinguish them from lineages with some otherwise 
very different properties and dynamics—both actual and possible. They do not 
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acknowledge how rich “lineage space” can be in principle, or the resultant need to locate 
our biological world in it.      19
 My proposal for how to start thinking more about the interplay between 
uniformity and diversity within and across species may be on the wrong track. But I 
hope to have shown that the implications of variation for the individuation of species is 
a more complicated issue than often recognized, and that it needs to be addressed 
without distractions from the specter of essentialism.  
Explanatory Issues 
 There is more to say about the Mayr-Sober/explanatory thread in the way of 
lessons than questions. First is to re-emphasize the genuinely explanatory focus of this 
strand. Much of the neo-essentialist revival has tended to focus on the individuation 
question. Devitt simply claims agreement with Sober’s substantive points and that his 
essentialism need not have any quarrel with him (371-372). This move underestimates 
the significance of the Mayr-Sober line of thought that seeks to gain reflective 
understanding about the sea change in our scientific understanding of the biological 
realm due to Darwin and Darwin-inspired developments.   
 There is no doubt that the introduction and maturation of “population thinking” 
as noticed by Mayr, and better developed by Sober, constitutes a profound change and 
improvement in our understanding of biology that is worth reflecting on. It has many 
implications, including ones that genuinely challenge what our everyday forms of 
!  This is true of de Queiroz’s (1999) otherwise wide-ranging defense of the lineage conception 19
of species. It is also the fatal flaw in Matthen’s (2013; 2009; Ereshefsy and Matthen 2005) 
repeated attempts to fault HPC-kind approaches to species for failing to adequately deal with 
what I call stable variation. Matthen cannot account for why stable variations within species are 
not nearly as diverse as they could conceivably be, nor why key differences in otherwise very 
similar cross-species polymorphs render them “incompatible” as within-species polymorphs.   
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generalizing judgment about biology lead us to believe. In fact, this may be one better 
way of stating the change. Aristotelian biology enshrined, and gave systematic backing 
to, our everyday forms of judgment that lead to what Sober called the “natural state 
model” of species, and which Michael Thompson (2008, 2004, 1995) has recently tried 
to defend. In contrast, just as physics and chemistry reached certain milestones in their 
development that forced us to give up in our theoretical beliefs what we find incredibly 
difficult to give up in our common sense judgments (the sun rises and sets), population 
thinking forces us to give up in our biological theories ideas that we may still find 
natural in everyday life.  
 Another way to appreciate population thinking is to see how it instituted a new 
form of explanation unknown to physics and chemistry. There are two ways to 
understand Kant’s (1790) claim that biology would never have its Newton. One is that 
our unsystematized teleological understanding of biological entities would never be 
reduced or systematically explained. Another, more specific way, is that it would never 
happen in a Newton-like way, i.e., with a few basic, universal laws governing the 
dynamics of all biological entities—perhaps ones that could then easily be reduced to the 
laws of physics. The advent of population thinking refutes Kant on the first 
interpretation, but does so while retaining principles specific to biology and unlike any 
that had been found in physics or chemistry.     20
 From this perspective, Mayr and Sober were too broad brushed in some ways, 
and not broad enough in others. Claiming outright that population thinking had 
!  Caveat: Principles of populations first discovered in biology and not present in most basic 20
physical systems. I do not mean to imply that there are no non-biological domains to which 
population thinking does not extend. 
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replaced typological and essentialist thinking was overly general and too ambitious. At 
the same time, focusing on figures of the past (Plato and Aristotle) also encouraged 
neglect over other ways in which population thinking contributes to insights distinctive 
to biology. Furthermore, population thinking does not cover species only. As Peter 
Godfrey-Smith’s Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection has firmly established, 
principles of population thinking extend throughout the many levels and regions of 
biology. They apply to different types of things (genes, cells, etc.). The reach of 
population thinking is profound. But it doesn’t rule out grouping things together on the 
basis of shared properties.  
 Finally, while my position must reject Walsh’s neo-essentialism, I do think his 
critique of Sober indicates something important. One is to be cautious about exuberant 
claims about breaks with the past and over reliance on one innovation in biological 
thinking. There is much that remains unknown about biology and further developments 
may bear some resemblance to ideas from the past. The bottom line here is that 
understanding the significance of population thinking in biology remains an important 
project that requires more nuance than the anti-essentialist banner allows.   
The Essentialist Impulse and “Psychological Essentialism” 
 Any position accusing a debate of fundamental confusion over an ancient concept 
of Western philosophy owes some sort of diagnosis or explanation for the situation. 
How could such smart people be so deluded for so long? One key to the diagnosis stems 
from the observation that essentialist positions seem to survive profound changes in 
what is considered admissible approaches to individuating entities and explaining 
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generalizations containing them. The profoundest such change, of course, was 
inaugurated by the scientific revolution and its rejection of Aristotelian substantial 
forms, teleology, etc.  
 My suggestion is that there has been a mistake about what is common across the 
changes. What survives such profound changes is not a stable metaphysical position or 
thesis (there are essences and this is what they are), but something closer to a regulative 
ideal that gets mistaken for such. That regulative ideal enjoins us to connect our 
individuating and explanatory practices as closely as possible. I’m more inclined to call 
it a regulative impulse or drive however, because I don’t think it has much more 
determinate content than that. This is why there can be such disagreement over what 
counts as a “truly” essentialist position with respect to F’s. What Aristotle correctly 
recognized is that there is interdependency in our individuating and explanatory 
practices.  Successful explanation depends on picking out the right explananda and 21
explanantia, and in the right sort of way. And the entities worth positing and being 
precise about are generally those that we identify as having explanatory power. What is 
right about anti-essentialist resistance is both the willingness to recognize when nature 
resists our desire to make individuation and explanation as simultaneously simple, 
unified, and powerful as possible and the refusal to turn our regulative drives into 
contentful metaphysical theses.  
 Part of the explanation for the confusion is surely Aristotle’s genius for 
recognizing an intellectual drive and articulating it into an explicit and worked out 
thesis. That set a powerful precedent for recognizing essentialism as a metaphysical or 
!  Charles 2003 brings this out well. 21
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theoretical doctrine. I’ll bet there is also some psychological tendency to reify, that 
crystallizes around the use of “essence”. What is potentially most interesting to my 
mind, however, is the connection between my speculations here and the psychological 
research program on native “essentialism”.  
 Psychologists have identified a tendency toward a suite of judgments in very 
young children that gets them labeled “essentialist” (Gelman 2003). Anthropologists 
have documented that at least some of these tendencies are culturally universal (see 
Atran 1999 and Atran et al, 1997). If my line of thought here is correct, it is wrong to 
identify this psychological tendency with a universal and coherent philosophical 
position (for there isn’t one). Fortunately, there is precedent in the literature for 
resisting this kind of identification. Michael Strevens (2000) argued that all the extant 
evidence was consistent and better accounted for without the assumption of a 
psychological posit of essences. While at least some psychologists have claimed to 
successfully respond to Strevens, my approach breathes new life into a Strevens-like 
project of re-examining and potentially re-interpreting the data (Gelman 2003). It could 
also suggest alternative hypotheses to test in this research area as well. Finally, it raises 
questions about how the mature intellectual drive I posit is related to the innate 
tendency toward “essentialistic” judgments observed in children. It also asks us to 
consider whether the essentialist impulse can be discerned in other intellectual 
traditions. Further development of these admittedly rough ideas will have to await 
another occasion.          
Conclusion  
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 The species essentialism issue is irreparably broken. It not only now fails to have 
the unity required for a solvable debate, the original anti-essentialist consensus lacked 
the unity that could be appealed to for restoration. Intraspecific  variation is crucial to 
understanding biology, but its importance has been misapplied and even overstated in 
some ways. It has different implications for how to individuate species taxa and how to 
understand the rise of new forms of explanation in biology. These two issues should be 
distinguished from each other and treated without concern for essences. There remains 
important work to be done on each. Further, coming to understand why the essentialism 
issue really is irredeemably confused also holds promise for shedding new light on the 
idea that humans are native “essentialists”.  
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MORE BARK THAN BITE: THE INNOCUOUS IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
EVOLUTIONARY DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 
Introduction 
 If you accept the evolutionary account of how humans came to be, and you 
understand it correctly, then you will reject human nature as a myth of a bygone era. 
That is the influential claim of many experts in evolutionary theory, including both 
biologists and philosophers of biology. The influential biologist-philosopher Michael 
Ghiselin declares: “What does evolution teach us about human nature? It tells us that 
human nature is a superstition” (1997, 1).  It is a claim that seems radical and 22
revolutionary on its face. It sounds like it should have many important consequences. 
But it doesn’t. At least, any sense in which it is true does not. 
 The first part of this paper examines the arguments meant to establish the 
absence of any human nature. “Human nature” is a vague and amorphous term.  23
Consequently, recent authors have realized, and argued, that there may be perfectly 
legitimate senses attached to it, which the evolutionary arguments don’t touch (see 
especially Machery 2008; Samuels 2012). I applaud the aims of these efforts, but think 
they proceed under the guidance of a too quick acceptance of the supposedly sound 
evolutionary arguments. While there are some sound parts of these arguments, suitably 
reconstructed, there is a lot of chaff surrounding them that needs to be separated and 
!  The mythical status of human nature is equally forcefully asserted by David Buller in his 22
influential attack on evolutionary psychology (2006, 480). David Hull’s 1986 “On Human 
Nature” is the locus classicus for this kind of view, which has been re-affirmed most recently by 
Tim Lewens (2012). See the introductory texts by Sterelny and Griffiths (1999) and Godfrey-
Smith (2014) for a sense of the widespread impact on the field. 
!  But good illustrations of well-known projects that would be threatened by the arguments 23
considered here are on display in Pinker (2003) and Tomasello (2001). 
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dispensed with. Doing so can contribute to illuminating how the project of articulating a 
scientifically sound conception of human nature should proceed.  
 It will also help us figure out what can be inferred from the rejection of human 
nature. This is the task of the second part of this paper. To take one example, the 
nativist-empiricist controversy is often associated with the investigation of what human 
nature is like (see, e.g., Prinz 2012). One might easily think that the evolutionary 
rejection of human nature should favor the empiricist-side of this debate, which also 
sometimes characterizes itself as showing that there is no such thing as human nature 
(ibid). As it turns out, though, the evolutionary rejection of human nature is fully 
compatible with the strongest of nativist theories of human psychology. There are other 
major consequences that the advocates of the evolutionary arguments have thought 
followed—for normative ethical and political theory; for the character of the human 
sciences; and for kinship with other philosophical movements. As I’ll show, none of 
these supposed implications follow. To put it most provocatively, even if there is no 
human nature, much science and philosophy concerned with ‘human nature-y’ topics 
may proceed as though there is, with minimal risk of any serious error.  
Evaluating the Arguments 
 As noted, “human nature” has many senses and uses. Rather than try to pin them 
down, I find it more effective to proceed by examining the arguments that have been 
offered against it. The main arguments come in two flavors, one more theoretical and 
one more empirical. The first type relies on a general anti-essentialism about biological 
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species thought to be at the heart of evolutionary theory. The second appeals to actual 
diversity found in the species to which humans belong. Here are schematic summaries.  
Theoretical Argument 
Incompatibility Evolutionary theory is incompatible with the existence of 
   species essences.  
   Therefore,  
~Essence  Homo sapiens has no essence shared by each of its member 
   organisms  (Intermediate Conclusion) 
Coverage  All humans belong to Homo sapiens.  
Bridge    Human Nature = common essence due to membership in H.   
   sapiens.  
   Therefore,  
~Human Nature There is no human nature.  
David Hull gives succinct expression to an instance of this type of argument:  
“If species are interpreted as historical entities, then particular organisms 
belong in a particular species because they are part of that genealogical nexus, 
not because they possess any essential traits. No species has an essence in this 
sense. Hence there is no such thing as human nature” (1978, 358).  
In what follows, I propose to grant Incompatibility, or at least a suitably interpreted 
and explained version of it which I provide in the next section. My aim is to show how 
little this weighty premise gets deniers of human nature. I do this in two ways. First, by 
cutting Incompatibility down to size through constructing a conception of human 
nature that is a candidate for confirmation by the human sciences (i.e., has not yet been 
ruled out by current evidence) and showing why it does not violate anti-essentialist 
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constraints. But I also insist on the necessity of, and substantive work being done in the 
argument by Coverage and Bridge. These latter two premises often slip by as implicit; 
or as so obvious as to not need argument; or as the only acceptable assumptions of a 
suitably naturalistic philosophy. But matters are not so simple. It turns out that non-
essentialist conceptions of human nature can be more substantial than deniers or 
deflaters of human nature suppose.  
Empirical Argument 
Uniformity  If there were a human nature, it would consist of traits held   
   by humans for which there could be little to no variation   
   across humans 
Diversity  There are no human traits for which there is little to no   
   variation across humans.  
   Therefore,  
~Human Nature 
We will look at more detailed arguments of this kind later, but David Buller expresses 
the thinking behind it thus:  
“…any psychological universals we might happen to discover—if we were to 
discover any at all—are temporally contingent. Today’s universals were not 
yesterday’s universals, and today’s universals may be possessed by only a 
fraction of our species, or even extinguished altogether, tomorrow. Thus, any 
psychological universals we might happen to discover in the present would 
not characterize Homo sapiens per se, but would only characterize our species 
at this particular moment in evolutionary time” (2006, 477).  
In examining this form of argument, I again grant the first premise (Uniformity). My 
focus will be on Diversity, and I show the arguments for it to be lacking. I also consider 
modifications of Diversity that also turn out to be indefensible. Or, at least not 
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defensible via the resources of evolutionary theory, which is the primary impetus behind 
the denials of human nature considered here. 
 Along the way, I flag and reject what I think of as “filler” arguments that have 
been part of the mix but which have even less force than those above, serving only to 
distract. By the end of this part of the paper, then, we should still be ready to affirm the 
incompatibility of evolutionary theory and conceptions of human nature containing 
essentialist commitments. But we should also be more antecedently skeptical of the 
power of that fact to imply broader conclusions. In the second part of the paper, I turn 
to affirming that skepticism for specific consequences that have been thought to follow. 
For now, I turn to the explication and examination of each of the above arguments in 
turn.   
Arguing via Evolutionary Theory 
 The linchpin of the theoretical argument above is Incompatibility—the idea 
that evolutionary theory and biological species essences just don’t mix. How is this 
incompatibility supposed to arise? Here, too, the question is vexed, also because of 
vagueness and varying uses of the key concepts. In another paper, I argue for 
eliminating the essentialism issue from debates about the metaphysics of species.  24
While I won’t depend on that conclusion here, I will lean on a lesson I draw from that 
debate. It is that we should identify more specific commitments usually associated with 
essentialism that mature evolutionary theory (i.e., not Darwin’s ideas alone) cannot 
!  See my “What to Salvage from the Species Essentialism Debate”24
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allow, rather than try to argue that it forbids essences per se.  This, I think, is all the 25
“anti-essentialism” we can garner from evolutionary theory, as well as all that we need. 
As a consequence, theories of human nature need only avoid those specific essentialist 
commitments in order to be compatible with evolutionary theory. In order to get to 
these commitments, though, we need to examine some common elements of anti-
essentialist arguments that do not work.  
 There are two types of evolutionary anti-essentialist arguments to consider. One, 
alluded to in the quote by Hull above, attempts to reclassify the species category so that 
none of its instances are the kind of thing that can have essences. The other makes 
various appeals to the role of intra-specific variation in evolution. As I show, only one of 
the ways of appealing to variation’s role leads to an appreciation for its incompatibility 
with certain essentialist commitments.      
 Ontological Category — Some argue that evolutionary theory recommends 
reclassifying the species category (Hull 1978; Ghiselin 1997). Before Darwin, species 
were understood to be kinds. Now they are understood as individuals. And individuals, 
it goes, do not possess essences, at least not in the same way as kinds do. In brief, all of 
the whale sharks do not share a common essence because the species to which they 
belong is not the sort of thing to possess an essence or to bestow one on them.   
 But even if we grant individualism about the species category and the 
metaphysics of individuals the argument assumes, the essentialist impulse can adapt. 
!  This is more or less the route taken by the most careful participants in the species 25
essentialism debate, anyway. The part of my paper that I don’t rely on here argues that even this 
way of proceeding cannot save the essentialism arguments, on either side, and so cannot save 
the debate as a whole. If the reader comes to suspect that the essentialism considered here is 
weaker than the essentialism that evolutionary theory can justifiably reject, I recommend my 
other paper. The upshot of that paper is that such supposed essentialist positions are will-o-the-
wisps that need not concern what genuine issues remain in the metaphysics of species.   
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On this view, whale sharks now relate to their species as parts relate to a whole. Whale 
sharks may all still share a common essence, though. It is generally fallacious to deduce 
the lack of a property in a whole to a lack of a property in each of its parts. And there 
appears to be no reasons to think that essences are a special exception.   26
 I raise the ontological category issue because two of the most influential and 
vociferous opponents of human nature, David Hull and Michael Ghiselin, are also two of 
the most influential advocates of species individualism, and Hull first raises the human 
nature issue at the end of his most widely cited defense of the individualist thesis (which 
I quoted from above).  But there are other arguments as well, which are more 27
important, and I think it is crucial not to get this issue mixed up in the human nature 
debate.   
 So the maneuver of switching ontological categories will not do the trick. The 
essentialism issue can just be recast. But there is a family of considerations of a different 
sort that may underly both the ontological shift and the anti-essentialism. Their 
common feature is that they all appeal, somehow, to how variation within species is 
understood, though this contributes to an illusion of  more unity to this range of 
considerations than there really is. When pulled apart it becomes easier to see that they 
span a wide range of capacity to actually undermine essentialism.  
 Variation — The historical element to the theory of evolution—the claim that all 
organisms are related by descent from one, or a few, initial organisms—demonstrates 
that biological relatedness is compatible with diachronic variation in biological traits of 
!  Both Devitt (2008) and Boyd (1999) argue what is basically the same point. 26
!  Buller (2005) also uses this argument has his main one against human nature. 27
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an extraordinary amount. But unless we are willing to assert that the entire tree of life is 
the only species, the sheer fact of this kind of variation should not undercut species 
essentialism. For as long as we distinguish different species on the tree of life, we can 
ask whether they have essences. Variation must play a different kind of role.  
 Variation has an indispensable function in the explanatory element of the theory 
of evolution—the idea that the historical facts mentioned above can be explained via the 
process of natural selection. That process requires a specific kind of variation. Namely, 
variation in heritable traits that contributes to patterns of differential reproduction in 
the entities (e.g., organisms) that possess them. As David Hull says, without this kind of 
variation, evolution (or at least evolution via natural selection) would “grind to a 
halt” (1986, 3). While true, this point is not itself reason to reject essentialism. There is 
no law prescribing that evolution must continue, and no reasonable essentialist position 
need concern itself with whether or not it does. Still, proper understanding of the role of 
variation in natural selection does require reorientation away from some tempting ways 
of conceiving of the biological realm, including ones often characterized as “essentialist”.    
 Historically, essentialist positions generally have both definitional and 
explanatory commitments.  So a conception of human nature avoiding both kinds of 28
commitments may be certified as essentialism-free. In the following sections, I will 
examine the issues of how the kind of variation required for natural selection is 
!  There is not an explicit consensus on this in the essentialism literature, either generally or 28
with respect to the species issue. But, clearly, a conception of human nature that avoids both 
kinds of essentialist commitments need not concern itself with the outcome of this issue. At best, 
the outcome of the issue would allow a non-essentialist conception of human nature more 
leeway than I am allowing here.  
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supposed to reorient species individuation and our explanatory framework for traits 
commonly found in a species.      
 Variation and Species Individuation—When Hilary Putnam helped revitalize 
“essentialism” in “Is Semantics Possible?” and “The Meaning of “Meaning””, he 
presented a certain picture of how we pick out kinds with “hidden” essences. We can 
encounter something that we treat as a sample of a kind and then say that it bears the 
same substance relation to other instances of the kind. We do this even though we do 
not know, or may even initially be mistaken about, what properties determine the same 
substance relation for the sampled kind. This is the story he told about water. The 
properties determining the same substance relation between all possible samples of 
water may be thought of as its essence.   
 As with water, one is tempted, so with species. One encounters a wolf for the first 
time and intends to count it as of a kind with all other organisms that bear the same 
substance or “same species” relation to it. This is a tempting picture indeed, and may be 
an apt description (or idealized description) for how naturalists have classified species 
pre- and even post- Darwin. But the historical biological facts and the facts about 
natural selection mentioned above suggest a different approach to grouping organisms.  
 If natural selection is a or even the driving force in the history of life, we ought to 
classify biological entities in a way that helps us track its movement through that 
history.  As described above, natural selection requires organisms that vary with 29
respect to heritable traits. To keep track of natural selection, then, we need to keep track 
of such variation. This kind of variation is a property of collections of organisms. And 
!  My way of framing the issues here has been significantly influenced by Godfrey-Smith’s 29
(2009).
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changes in that variation are tracked by changes in those collections. These collections 
are called populations, and populations are the primary locus of evolutionary change. As 
the variation that matters is variation in heritable traits, we need to track relations of 
inheritance—we need to track relations of reproduction. Populations, to the rough 
approximation necessary for our purposes, are reproductive communities, or 
communities competing over the same resources (including those necessary for 
reproduction). Reproductive communities give rise to lineages of descent.      
 To track the influence of natural selection, the primary groupings we need to 
track are Darwinian populations and lineages. From the point of view of natural 
selection, then, employing Putnam’s method upon encountering a wolf is the wrong way 
to start. What we should be interested in is not: what same substance relation would 
group this wolf with other organisms? At least not where the same substance relation is 
modeled on that of the microstructural approach to chemical kinds like water. Insofar as 
that approach recommends picking out a simple, uniform genetic profile from a wolf to 
determine wolf-hood, it would fail to account for wolf sexual dimorphism.    
 Instead, then, we should ask: what Darwinian population and lineage does this 
creature belong to?  And given that Darwinian populations are characterized by some 
degree of diversity, we cannot presume ahead of time what sorts of similarities we 
should expect to find across all (and only) members of the relevant Darwinian 
population. Nor should we run the risk of limiting, ahead of time, what sorts of novelties 
may arise in populations or lineages by seeking to delimit them from the point of view of 
a Putnam-style search for the “same substance” on the basis of extant samples.  
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 The upshot of these considerations is that, from the point of view of Darwinian 
evolution, organisms should be grouped together on the basis of population and lineage 
membership, not a grouping criterion picking out a simple set of duplicable 
microstructures determining something like a Putnam-esque “same substance” relation 
for species members. This is not to say that all and only wolves won’t have some 
“microstructural” things in common. But, for instance, the Darwinian population that 
they belong to will depend on some microstructural (and other) differences between 
many of its member wolves (e.g., ones necessary for sexual dimorphism).    
Consequences for Human Nature 
 The consequences of the above for human nature may now be stated. If the 
biological taxon H. sapiens is individuated according to lineage-population criteria, then 
our concept of human nature should not propose a contrary way of individuating the H. 
sapiens taxon. It should not propose membership criteria that include organisms that 
the lineage criteria exclude nor include organisms that the lineage criteria exclude.  
 One easy way for a conception of human nature to avoid conflicting individuating 
criteria is by not entering the individuation game at all. It can simply refuse to be about 
species classification. This may seem overly revisionary. Surely, one might think, the 
notion of human nature was always meant to help us figure out what counts as human. 
But I think the charge of revisionism cuts more strongly in the opposite direction. It is a 
revisionist interpretation of the aims of traditional interest in human nature to suppose 
that it was ever meant to compete with the aims of the lineage approach to delineating 
the H. sapiens taxon. It may turn out that the class of organisms of interest to human 
nature theorists is a sub-population or sub-lineage of H. sapiens. 
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 As I’ll discuss more once we have the explanatory element of essentialism on the 
table, the foregoing shows why Coverage and Bridge are so much more important to 
the theoretical argument against human nature than usually acknowledged. There 
appears to be an implicit and challengeable assumption of a theoretical identity claim 
between the class of things usually targeted by human nature theorists and the members 
of the lineage that biologists designate as H. sapiens.  
 For now, let me note an important limitation of this way of accepting the lessons 
of species anti-essentialism. The argument just given does not rely on, nor imply, a 
principle according to which all heritable traits in a species either do or even can vary 
across generations. In fact, it is fully consistent with a principle according to which the 
variation required for natural selection is dependent on the existence of other invariant 
traits.   
Variation and Explanation 
 The absence of essences qua same-substance determiners is a problem for 
essentialist modes of explanation in biology as well. Suppose we have two organisms 
that are supposed to be conspecific due to a presumed same-substance relation. Then, if 
they significantly differ, it becomes a special problem to explain why. One organism is a 
“normal” instance of the kind and the other is, somehow, not. Hence, we get 
asymmetries in form of explanation for their traits:   
Essentialist Tiger Claw Explanation 
Kind Membership Organism X has claws because it is a tiger.  
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Disturbance  Organism Y does not have claws because, although it is  
    a tiger, there was an interference preventing it from   
    possessing claws.  
The essentialist mode of explanation for why two organisms in the same species differ 
with respect to certain traits employs an asymmetry in form of explanation. One 
explanation appeals solely to what is “natural" to the organism in virtue of the kind it 
belongs to. The other appeals to factors purely extrinsic to the organism to explain its 
trait.  
 In contrast, we now know that there are efficient causal mechanisms, both 
internal and external to an organism, which, in combination, are wholly sufficient to 
explain the traits that any two organisms have. Differences between organisms are to be 
explained by differences in the developmental history of each organism. Gone is any 
explanation of difference by form of explanation. It is replaced by explanation in terms 
of locating differences in the chains of efficient causation that constitute development. 
Now we have:  
Modern Biological Tiger Claw Explanation 
Development  Organism X has claws because of the developmental   
    trajectory of its genetic material embedded in its particular  
    environment.  
Development  Organism Y does not have claws because of the   
    developmental trajectory of its genetic material embedded in 
    its particular environment.   
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 Organisms may differ over whether the main factors with respect to a given trait 
were primarily genetic or more environmental or close to an equal share. The point is 
that there is not a difference in fundamental type of explanation. 
 Of course, we also need an explanation for why tigers tend to have claws. But 
there is no appeal in modern biology to anything like a tiger-substance that has claw 
possession as part of its “nature”. Rather, modern biology appeals to selection histories 
within populations to explain how certain kinds of claws came to be prevalent, or even 
fixated, in tiger lineages.  We are also learning more and more about how we will have to 
incorporate facts about regularities of robustness in developmental pathways to fully 
adequately explain the historical patterns of selection generating tiger-claws.  But this 30
is best understood as ongoing discovery of facts about development, and not any kind of 
return to abandoned forms of explanation.    
 The foregoing is meant to arrive, by a slightly different route, at much the same 
point that Eliot Sober argues for in his 1980 paper, “Evolution, Population Thinking, 
and Essentialism,” which is a refinement and development of Ernst Mayr’s (159/1975) 
distinction between “population thinking” and “typological thinking”. There he makes 
the case that species essentialism is committed to a “natural state” model according to 
which a type is identified as the norm in a species and all intraspecific diversity is 
understood as deviation from the type. In contrast, population thinking understands 
any norm-designated type as just one variant among others. It may be most prevalent. 
And its prevalence may have significant consequence for population dynamics. But that 
!  See Wagner (2014) for a good recent summary on this issue. 30
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significance has to do with general principles that have been discovered in population 
biology, not with anything like a telic-function associated with the prevalent type.   
Human Nature without Essences 
 For a conception of human nature to be anti-essentialism compatible, then, it 
must not propose individuation criteria for Homo sapiens that rule out or ignore its 
character as a lineage. It also cannot play the role of a normative standard in relation to 
which we understand either (human) psychological generalizations or individual 
(human) psychologies.  
 But the above constraints leave plenty of leeway for a conception of human 
nature. It may still have both descriptive and explanatory features. In particular, 
“human nature” may pick out the set of psychological features (if any) that evolved to 
fixation around the onset of what has been called “behavioral modernity” roughly 
40,000 years ago (Nowell 2010). Or perhaps the subset of those features that have 
remained at fixation since that time. Call this latter conception the inertial behavioral 
modernity conception of human nature (IBM).  
 The IBM conception does what a theoretical proposal should. That there is 
something to it is a good empirical bet. The proposed set is extremely likely to be far 
from empty. It is likely to contain features that help explain the evolution and character 
of early human cultures, and perhaps even broad features of contemporary cultures. Yet 
it does not impose on science’s ability to surprise us with discoveries about it. Perhaps 
science will tell us that if evolved universal or species-typical psychological traits are 
important to our conception of human nature, then we should include features that 
appeared later than whatever the onset of behavioral modernity turns out to be. IBM 
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doesn’t, of course, rule out the evolution of any number of further psychological traits in 
the Homo sapiens lineage.  
 Any resistance to IBM from our theoretical argument cannot come by way of 
Incompatibility. Rather, it can only come from Bridge, the principle equating human 
nature with a common essence shared by members of Homo sapiens. There are two 
parts to Bridge to consider. The idea that human nature must be an essence and the 
idea that, whatever human nature is, it must be common to all members of Homo 
sapiens.  
 The idea that human nature, if it is to exist, must be an essence of some sort or 
another has multiple problems. In this context, it is important that this is an extra-
evolutionary assumption. That might be justified if it was obvious that all those, 
especially in the human sciences, who work on human nature thought of it as an essence 
of some sort. But this is not a good interpretation of the average scientist of human 
nature, or even past philosophers (e.g., Hume ). There is no indication that most 31
psychologists think of themselves as investigating the human essence in anything like a 
technical philosophical sense, or of espousing the essentialist tenets that are genuinely 
incompatible with evolutionary theory.  
 Next is the assumption that the class of creatures with human nature must be co-
extensive with the class of creatures in Homo sapiens. Perhaps this is encouraged by the 
Coverage premise, but it should be recognized that it is not logically required by it. 
Coverage is compatible with the set of humans being a proper subset of the set of 
creatures in Homo sapiens. Given the lineage approach to individuating species, there 
!  See Samuels 2012 for a good argument in support of this claim. 31
!67
need not be any assumption that “humans” was ever meant to pick out precisely what 
the lineage approach to species will.  
 To put this point a bit differently, the lineage approach to species does not rule 
out the idea of different kinds or, maybe better, natural “joints” arising over the course 
of the lineage. In fact, to recognize the emergence of behavioral modernity just is to 
recognize the arrival of such a new joint. Insofar as the various fields in the human 
sciences are actually tracking something when they claim to be studying “human 
nature”, it may be the “joint” that arose with behavioral modernity and continues today. 
Or a different such joint that future scientific work may discover. The point is that 
nothing in the theoretical argument rules this out. Insofar as invocations of human 
nature do partially track something, there is no need to antecedently rule that out by 
saying that it must track something among all the creatures picked out on a lineage-
based individuation of Homo sapiens. Whether it does pick out anything should be more 
of an empirical claim.  
 The IBM conception of human nature survives the theoretical argument. It is 
subject to theoretical and empirical refinement or even replacement. An alternative may 
be desirable for any number of reasons. I neither fully endorse nor reject it here. But the 
idea that it or any reasonable alternative is ruled out in principle by evolutionary theory 
is simply false. However, it does rely on a conjecture that there is bound to be quite a bit 
of psychological uniformity over time in human populations. So it is time to examine the 
more empirically oriented argument against this conjecture.    
The Empirical Argument 
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 The dialectic above deals with the claim that human nature is somehow 
incompatible with evolutionary theory in principle. I argued that this is true only for 
certain highly theoretically loaded conceptions of human nature. Ones that it is 
uncharitable to attribute to most working scientists who think of themselves as studying 
human nature. In this section, I consider an argument aimed at any reasonable 
conception of human nature worth the name. It asserts that, as an empirical matter, 
there is more human diversity than any theory of human nature can abide. I argue that 
the empirical facts do not show this and that the idea that they do is motivated by extra-
empirical assumptions.  
 A version of this argument has been affirmed most recently by Tim Lewens in 
“Human Nature—the Very Idea” (2012). But it is a theme in the writings of David Hull 
and David Buller as well. They argue that the idea that there is any significant amount of 
uniformity, or even species-typicality, in human beings is an illusion due to the present 
moment of human beings’ evolution. Buller calls the tendency a “temporal 
provincialism” (2005, 477-8). In the following arguments, then, all claims about human 
diversity should be understood to be temporally unrestricted. I show that the argument 
that there is not sufficient temporally unrestricted uniformity in human characteristics 
for a robust human nature does not succeed.     
 Recall the “empirical argument” outlined at the beginning:  
Empirical Argument 
Uniformity  If there were a human nature, it would consist of traits held   
   by humans for which there could be little to no variation   
   across humans 
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Diversity  There are no human traits for which there is little to no   
   variation across humans.  
   Therefore,  
~Human Nature 
In what follows, I will leave aside Uniformity. While contestable, I think it better 
discussed in the course of constructing a positive conception of human nature. Diversity 
is the main claim of the human nature deniers and I think it can easily, and 
illuminatingly, be met.  
 In addressing Diversity, note first that it involves a negative existential. Since 
human traits number at least in the thousands, and there are limited resources, 
Diversity cannot be confirmed by direct observation. It must be backed up by inductive 
support. There are certainly some traits that are not universal. Not every adult human 
being has 20/20 vision. But we still need a reason for why we have a sufficient basis 
from which to project Diversity. Given that various scientific fields continue to 
discover new types of human traits (often quite surprising), it seems hasty to conclude 
that the basis for projecting from the diversity we do know of is that it is just so 
observably ubiquitous. We need reason for why we should expect that novel kinds of 
traits that take extensive empirical investigation to discover should not be uniform 
across humans as well. I think that the role of variation in natural selection is doing 
double duty here. It leads some to think that there must be variation everywhere. But, as 
I argued above, that is not required by the theory of natural selection. That some 
variation is needed does not entail that there is variation in all traits.  
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 Appreciating the theoretical motivations for why Diversity might be thought to 
be an empirically safe bet is important. Because Diversity is just plain false—and 
seemingly obviously so. All humans have: bones, sensory neurons, motor neurons, blood 
vessels, etc. Accommodating these basic facts about humans demands revising 
Diversity. Below are two modified descendants of Diversity, versions of which have 
played a role, sometimes just implicit, in arguments in the anti-human nature literature.      
Distinctiveness There are no distinctively human traits for which there is little  
   to no variation across humans.  
Propriety  There are no human traits for which there is little to no   
   variation across humans and which are proper candidates for  
   human nature.  
I will address both Distinctiveness and Propriety in turn.  
 Distinctiveness demands that the existence of human nature entail that of all 
traits unique to humans, at least one has insignificant amounts of variation across 
humans. Why should this demand be recognized, though? Suppose it turned out that 
human nature was continuous with some other nature, perhaps chimpanzee nature or 
primate nature or even mammalian nature. If this were indeed so, we would be justified 
in saying something like, “human nature is nothing over and above primate nature”.  
But that would be very different than saying something like, “well, it turns out that 
humans have no nature”.  There is a huge chasm between the state of affairs in which 
humans have no nature at all and the one in which they simply share natures with other 
biological beings. Claiming there is no distinctive human nature is importantly different 
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from claiming that there is no human nature at all, and the dialectic in the literature 
should better reflect that.  
 There is more to be said to directly confront Distinctiveness. What is the 
empirical evidence for it supposed to be? There are many kinds of traits that are unique 
to humans, under many different categories: genetic material, developmental and 
ageing processes, physiology, morphology, psychology, and behavior. Are we really to 
believe that amidst all this uniqueness there is no significant uniformity? I do not find 
convincing arguments to this effect, but only bald assertions that do not demonstrate 
any sort of biological consensus on the issue.  Let me discuss, though, an example of a 32
type of argument that may be taken to suggest otherwise. It appeals to actual examples 
of human diversity and tries to infer broader conclusions about its extent. 
Polytypicality Projection 
 Many arguments of this flavor appeal to the polytypic nature of certain traits 
within human populations. Such arguments are potentially powerful because they do 
not appeal to slight variations or gradations that might suggest that the relevant 
variation is largely ephemeral or insignificant. Rather, they show that there are stable, 
causally salient variations in evolutionarily significant traits. In a specific case of this 
argument type, David Hull (1986, 5-6) appeals to human blood type which is certainly 
polytypic. Apparently more than 30 blood groups are recognized by scientists. Most 
people will be familiar, though, with the A, B, AB, and O groups (and each’s +/- 
!  Buller (2006) is a good example of repeated assertions to this effect and in a tone that treats 32
it as either obvious or part of some well established scientific consensus.  But there is no citation 
of literature establishing such a consensus. See Machery and Barrett (2006) for an important 
critique of Buller’s misinterpretation of the literature he criticizes and which also presses him on 
his exaggerated claims concerning diversity. Devitt (2008) also presses this point against anti-
essentialist arguments. As my earlier arguments should indicate, I disagree with him over 
whether the exaggerations of variation are relevant to the issue of essentialism. 
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versions). Hull cites this example and goes on to argue as though if something as basic 
and important as blood is so polytypic in humans, there is no reason to suppose that any 
trait could exhibit the level of uniformity required for a human nature.   
 This kind of move is way too fast. In humans, blood groups are identified by 
antigens attached to the surface of red blood cells. But human blood has hundreds (at 
least) of characteristics in addition to surface antigens. To suggest that the case of 
polytypicality in surface antigens is sufficient reason to suppose that none of the 
characteristics of human blood are uniform across individuals is rash indeed. For 
starters, all human blood will contain hemoglobin. Nor is the case of antigens sufficient 
to justify the conclusion that none of the uniformities in human blood are also 
distinctive to human blood. Determining whether or not there are any such would 
require far more consultation with the empirical science on blood than Hull offers.  
 Hull is not the only thinker to wield the blood type example as a basis for 
rejecting human nature. In their influential introductory text to the philosophy of 
biology, Kim Sterelny and Paul Griffiths write:   
“So no general biological principle suggests that human moral feelings, 
mental abilities, or fundamental desires should be any more uniform than 
human blood type or eye color” (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 8).  
What they assert is true in virtue of the fact that general biological principles are silent 
on the matter. No such principles suggest that the mentioned psychological traits aren’t 
more uniform. Whether they are is an empirical question for the human sciences. But let 
us suppose that some human psychological characteristics are like eye color or blood 
type. If there really is a good analogy here, wouldn’t we expect them to occur against the 
background of larger uniformities? That is, wouldn’t we expect broader psychological 
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uniformities as we do with human eyes and human blood? More care should be taken in 
the use of physiological polymorphisms as somehow illustrative for human nature. They 
don’t straightforwardly show what they have been taken to show.    
 My purpose here is not to make a positive case for, e.g., unique and universal 
characteristics of human blood. But the alternative inference to the absence of such is 
not forced on us, or so much as suggested, by an appreciation of antigen diversity. The 
perspective shift brought on by population thinking (a la Sober 1980) may help us better 
appreciate the theoretical and evolutionary importance of diversity, but that doesn’t 
require us to deny that such diversity exists alongside uniformity. Population thinking 
doesn’t give the kind of theoretical boost needed to license an inductive leap from 
instances of polymorphism to something as strong as Distinctiveness.  
 Another evolutionary consideration that ought not count in favor of 
Distinctiveness is the mere possibility of future evolution of currently distinctive 
human traits in other species. To illustrate, I’d like to make a somewhat conjectural 
claim about some distinctively species-typical traits possessed by humans which I think 
is likely to be true, though with some scientifically-informed refinement and increased 
precision.    
 Consider these examples of distinctive species-typical traits of humans:  
Self-Control: There is some level of reflective self-control, L, such that L is not achieved 
by any other animal, but is achieved by virtually all statistically normal adult humans.  
Frustration: For virtually all statistically normal adult humans, there is some level of 
self-control, perhaps different for each, that each would like to attain, but does not.   
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 By self-control, I mean the capacity to forgo the satisfaction of some impulses and 
desires in order to attain the satisfaction of other, reflectively chosen, goals. Frustration 
is meant to express the fact that even the most disciplined of humans sometimes falters 
in some way. And that even the most seemingly “contentedly impulsive” can come to 
recognize that sometimes some of their impulses and desires frustrate others that they 
would count as of greater importance to them.  
 Call the combination of the above traits Tragic Self-Control (TSC). I claim that 
TSC is an excellent candidate for distinctive universality in (statistically) normally 
developed humans from at least the dawn of behavioral modernity. Furthermore, we 
have no reason to think that it will be eliminated from human populations. Note, as 
well, that varying levels of self-control, or desired self-control, in humans does nothing 
to undermine my claim. That is, it doesn’t so long as the variation is within the range of 
L and P, where P designates a level of “perfect” self control. What we cannot rule out, 
however, is the evolution of TSC in other lineages in the future. But that possibility need 
not threaten the project of refining TSC and figuring out whether there is a version of it 
that is indeed true of humans, and humans alone. If true, TSC is a distinctive species-
typical trait of humans now, and for the foreseeable future.      
 While perhaps I am wrong about TSC in particular, above I suggested that it 
strains credulity to suppose that amidst all the many unique features found in humans 
at all different levels of their biology, there is not one that is virtually universal. It may 
be responded that even if there are such traits, they are not likely to be the sorts of traits 
people have searched for in the quest for human nature. This kind of response pushes in 
the direction of Propriety, the claim that some kinds of traits are proper candidates for 
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human nature and some are not. Indeed, Hull explicitly denies that there is good reason 
to believe that there are universals unique to humans that aren’t “vacuous” (1986, 4).   
The Propriety of Traits 
 Propriety asserts that not all human traits are candidates for human nature. 
This implies that there are some human traits such that even if they are universal, they 
would not count as constituting part of human nature. Clearly a claim like this requires 
some conception of what human nature could be in principle. If not just any trait can be 
a part of human nature, then there must be some kind of substantial conception that 
rules some traits in and some out. It should be obvious, though, that evolutionary theory 
and population thinking are silent on matters of in principle conceptions of human 
nature. They say nothing about whether a trait would count as part of human nature if it 
were universal. Here it seems like the force of population thinking/evolution has 
genuinely given out. There are arguments to be had, at least partly philosophical in 
character, about substantive conceptions of human nature and the traits they propose as 
candidates for its makeup. Then there is empirical investigation to be done about how 
close to universal such traits come.  Besides ruling out essentialist conceptions, as 33
already acknowledged, general principles of evolutionary theory can make no difference 
to the outcome of this process.  
 Perhaps I’ve misjudged the direction of the dialectic at this point, however. Hull 
acknowledged that one could mean something by “human nature” that is quite anodyne 
!  I do not mean to imply that universality is sufficient (or even necessary) for inclusion in 33
human nature. But it is a good first pass for determining which traits deserve further 
examination for inclusion. There ought to be really good reason to rule out universal traits as 
potential candidates prior to inquiry into whether or not they meet further empirical criteria. 
I’m arguing that none has been offered. 
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in comparison to such substantive conceptions (1986, 9). He was after bigger game, 
however: the kind of “human nature” that has been invoked by theorists and 
philosophers down the ages. In his eyes, it was the traditional invokers of human nature 
who have a vision of what traits would count as part of human nature. And perhaps he 
thought those traits were likely to be less than uniform throughout human populations. 
Unfortunately, he didn’t cite a single such theorist of human nature or articulate for us 
even broad contours of their conceptions. Given the number and diversity of such 
theorists, he ought to have. It leaves us little to work with in evaluating his target.    
 Still, in his paper it becomes clear that Hull’s target is not just human nature per 
se, but some of the purposes for which thinkers have employed it, especially odious 
ones. I will address that aspect of his argument in detail in the next part of the paper. 
For now, let me say that, certainly, it would be nice to undercut all nefarious invocations 
of human nature in one fell swoop. Showing that there is no such thing would 
accomplish this aim.  But things just aren’t so simple.  Human nature qua theoretical 
notion deserves a theoretical hearing like any other, regardless of social purposes it may 
be employed for. This means, among other things, allowing ourselves the potential to be 
surprised in the course of investigation by the content and explanatory reach of human 
nature. But allowing ourselves that option requires us not to be beholden to thinkers of 
the past or to current judgments of intrinsic interest when it comes to the candidacy of 
particular traits.  Let me be more specific.  34
 Do humans have violent motivations or tendencies? Human violence has been 
considered a candidate trait for human nature if any has. Let us suppose it turned out 
!  This is so even if we also seek continuity with the broad contours of historical debates to 34
justify continued employment of the term “human nature”. 
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that human motivation is polytypic with respect to violence or aggression. Some 
percentage of humans inclines toward violently aggressive behavior and some 
percentage does not. So there is no uniform human nature with respect to violent 
behavior. That game theoretic models show that it is possible for populations to evolve 
stable balances between “Hawks” and “Doves” is commonly appealed to by deniers of 
uniform human nature (e.g., Sternly and Griffiths [1999] and Buller [2005]). Now 
suppose that something more or less the same turns out to be true with respect to each 
motivational trait that has been the subject of controversy and speculation in historical 
discussion (altruism, social praise and recognition, etc.). Shall we conclude then that 
there is no human nature with respect to motivation in general?  
 We should do so only if it turns out that human populations are polytypical with 
respect to every human motivation, not just the ones that tend to exercise the most 
controversy. I’ll assume that there has been relatively little debate over the extent to 
which humans are motivated to pursue the basic means of survival. It comes as close to 
a universal motivation as any we are likely to find. There is a way this most fundamental 
of motivations tends to be realized in humans, how it interacts with their other 
psychological features, and how it gets expressed in behavior. It may not be as sexy a 
topic as altruism or aggression. But the character of the drive for survival is part of the 
contours of human nature if anything is. Lack of historical controversy or current 
scientific attention, if such there be, does not change this. Nor does whether or not the 
drive for survival has been exploited for fiendish purposes.   35
!  I may be betraying a lack of credulity for Prinz’s (2012) extreme position that would reject 35
appeals to human nature even here. But his considerations are of a different sort than the ones 
under consideration. I admit that a proper response to his position would require a different 
mode of attack. 
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 Any substantive conception of human nature will likely have some constraints on 
what kinds of traits may be considered candidates for inclusion. That is unavoidable. 
But the principles determining trait candidacy need to be made explicit so we can 
deliberate about them. None have been proposed as direct consequences of evolutionary 
theory and it is hard to see how any could. Bald assertions of vacuity are not helpful. But 
we also shouldn’t be held captive by historical precedent in determining trait candidacy. 
On the contrary, we should be open to the idea that human nature consists of many 
traits that have never exercised controversy.  
 In addressing the more empirically based argument against human nature, I have 
focused solely on Diversity and variations that might capture different motivations 
behind it. I have argued that none of them are defensible, which is sufficient to defeat 
the argument. I have not addressed Uniformity and won’t argue against it here. But it 
is worth saying that I don’t think it is unassailable. That is, there may be reason to 
include a polymorphic trait within the domain of human nature. But I will not attempt 
to argue for that now. My primary purpose has been to show that insufficient reason has 
been given to expect that polymorphisms are pervasive in human psychology.  
 This concludes the first part of the paper. If my argument are successful, what is 
sound in the evolutionary arguments against human nature do nothing to undermine 
quite substantial conceptions of human nature. One, the behaviorally-modern (IBM) 
conception, remains viable. It can arguably satisfy two potentially conflicting desiderata: 
being recognizable to historically prominent proposals for a science of human nature; 
and being informed and refined by the actual evolutionary history of humans. It should 
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be clear that potential alternatives remain viable as well. It has not been part of my 
project to defend the behaviorally modern conception as the correct one.  
 We should also now be in a position to better judge whether conclusions that 
have been thought to follow from the idea that there is no such thing as human nature 
really do. I turn to that evaluative task next.    
Turning Down the Bark-Volume 
 As acknowledged in the first part of this paper, there are conceptions of human 
nature for which it would be correct to say: there is no such thing. This surely includes 
some influential ones from history (e.g., Aristotle’s?). So it might be thought that 
important lessons may be drawn from rejecting them. In contrast, I think there are 
important lessons to be learned from showing what tempting ideas do not follow. I 
begin by showing what little consequence there is for one of the most important debates 
generally associated with “human nature”—the nativism vs. empiricism debate. Then I 
critique specific conclusions that have been drawn concerning morality and politics, the 
human sciences, and kinship between philosophical movements.  
Nativism vs. Empiricism 
 In Beyond Human Nature: How Culture and Experience Shape Our Lives, Jesse 
Prinz argues for the slogan that: “by nature, we transcend nature” (368). He intends to 
breath life into an empiricist view of human psychology which he thinks has been 
unjustifiably abandoned by large swaths of the human sciences. Does the thesis that 
there is no human nature, as considered here, lend any support to Prinz’s project?  
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 It should be clear now that it does not. The theoretical arguments are silent on 
psychological mechanisms in any species. And, as far as the principles of natural 
selection are concerned, any and all human psychological variation could be variation in 
nativist traits (however that gets spelled out). So even if the more empirically oriented 
arguments were successful, they would not necessarily support the empiricist point of 
view. Still, it is instructive to consider in more depth how evolutionary arguments bear 
on the nativist-empiricist debate. What matters more to that debate than the need for 
variation in natural selection is the gradualistic and conservative (or “cost-effective”) 
nature of Earthly evolution.   
 Advances in the human and related sciences have significantly refined the terms 
of the nativism-empiricism debate since, say, the time of the Leibniz-Locke controversy. 
We cannot do justice to all the details here. What we can do, which will be important for 
our purposes, is see how it is possible to understand nativist and empiricist positions as 
ends of a spectrum. Accordingly, it is possible for different creatures’ psychologies to be 
more or less empiricist (nativist) in an illuminating way, rather than as wholly one or 
the other.  
 The following way of characterizing the debate is especially influenced by 
Samuels (2002) and Margolis and Laurence (2013).  On this way of construing the 36
distinction, the key issue on which nativists and empiricists differ concerns fundamental 
psychological mechanisms. This notion depends on a cognitive science-informed way of 
drawing a line between psychological and purely biological mechanisms. The 
fundamental psychological ones, then, are those whose operations are used to explain 
 Prinz (2012) understands much of the debate in a very similar way (see esp. 8-14). 36
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behavior and non-fundamental psychological processes, but are in turn to be explained 
only by non-psychological (i.e., biological) mechanisms. They are explanantia for 
psychological and behavioral explananda; explananda for biological explanantia.  
 Nativists and empiricists differ over the character of fundamental psychological 
mechanisms in two primary respects: domain specificity and developmental plasticity. 
Nativist mechanisms are highly domain specific. That is, they are dedicated to particular 
kinds of cognitive tasks, e.g., spatial navigation, numerical cognition, social cognition, 
object recognition, etc. Empiricist mechanisms are highly domain general. They may 
perform a variety of cognitive functions. Hence, nativists tend to posit more 
fundamental psychological mechanisms than empiricists. That is, they understand basic 
human psychology as more structured and richly specified.  
 In terms of development, nativists posit fundamental mechanisms that are more 
highly invariant across a specified range of developmental environments (e.g., those that 
can sustain full development). The empiricist end of the spectrum says that the 
fundamental mechanisms are much more variable over the same set of environmental 
conditions. So the extreme nativist posits many, domain-specific psychological 
mechanisms that are tightly constrained in how they develop. And the extreme 
empiricist posits one, or a few, domain-general psychological mechanisms that are 
highly developmentally sensitive to many features of their physical and cultural 
environments. Both extremes may be understood as anchoring two ends of a spectrum 
allowing for middle positions with respect to the number of domain specific 
mechanisms and the degree of their flexibility.     
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 From the point of view of the arguments considered in the first part of the paper, 
even this updated version of the controversy may seem misguided. For, it might be 
thought, evolutionary theory should lead us to expect there to be variation along the 
scale in a way that falsifies the idea that human psychology is uniformly nativistic or 
empiricist. But there are a number of ways in which there might be individual variation. 
There could be continuous variation across the scale that is either uniform or modal 
(Figure 1: Panmorphic 1 & 2).  There could be polymorphic variation around a few 37
nodes (Figure 1: Polymorphic). Or there could be variation clustered around one node 
(Figure 1: Monomorphic). Over time, the node could move in one direction or another. 
All are consistent with the general requirements of evolution by natural selection. So the 
nativist-empiricist controversy should only seem misguided if good reason is given to 
expect that the monomorphic option is not likely, or that the polymorphic option is 
more likely. But none such arguments have been offered.  
 In fact, comparative ethology and cognition give us good reason to think that 
wherever it happens to be on the scale, human psychologies are likely to be more 
 Thanks to Colleen Sullivan for help with the figure. 37
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Figure 1: Possible distributions of individual psychologies 
monomorphic than not. Perhaps surprisingly, this is because, from a sufficiently general 
but well-motivated standpoint, a large proportion of all species capable of perception 
and learning are of the same “psychmorph”. And this thanks to the fact that there are 
general principles that characterize Earthly perceptual and learning systems 
(Shettleworth 2013, 1998; Hauser 2001; Heyes 2012). Examples include principles of 
habituation, constancies, associative learning, and memory (ibid).  And the 
commonalities multiply as cognition becomes more complex. Humans share features of 
“core cognition” regarding object recognition and quantitative and spatial cognition 
(among others) with many species they are distantly related to and more such features 
with ones they are closely related to (Carey 2009).  
 Of course, we do not want to go too far, and deny that there are not very 
important cognitive differences between species. But when we are asking a very general 
question like: do biological psychologies tend to be more nativist or empiricist?, then 
such differences are less important. If the question is whether species tend to have 
specialized, dedicated cognitive mechanisms with highly canalized development, then it 
is not as significant whether a species has a particular one that others don’t. If the 
question is whether perceptual systems tend to be geared into learning mechanisms 
governed by common associative principles, it far less relevant whether a given sensory 
modality in a species is sensitive to a wider spectrum of stimuli than in others. Those 
kinds of variations are very important for other kinds of questions, but not to the 
nativist-empiricist controversy. As the evidence stands, animal psychologies tend to be a 
combination of generalized associative learning mechanisms and specialized cognitive 
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mechanisms (Shettleworth 2013; Heyes 2012). They are somewhere in the middle of our 
nativist/empiricist scale.  
 When it comes to humans, it is clear that they are able to learn a lot more kinds of 
things and have much more flexible behavior than other creatures. The best explanation 
may require shifting the human species closer to the nativist or empiricist ends of the 
scale. I won’t take a stand on that issue here. What we shouldn’t expect to see is that the 
uniquely human capacity for learning and flexibility is the result of wide, ongoing, and 
continuous variation toward both ends of the scale. Or the evolution of widely divergent 
polymorphs on the scale. Given what we know about the conservation of brain and 
cognitive architecture over evolutionary time, and the generally gradual pace of it, 
variation of this degree is highly unlikely (see Allen 2009). Appreciation for variation 
inspired by principles of evolution by natural selection do not, cannot, render the 
nativism-empiricism debate obsolete. Rather, general facts about how it tends to work 
in the biological material we are familiar with can reinforce specific answers to the 
debate. 
 So one lesson to learn here is that it is not simply the principles of evolutionary 
theory as they could be featured in systems of very different materials, organization, and 
so on. Rather, we need to think about principles of evolution of stuff around here. 
Radical changes in the basic organizations of most things is very expensive. The 
mechanisms of evolution, whether natural selection or drift, will be more likely to tinker 
than to overhaul. Insofar as the traversal of large distances on the nativist-empiricist 
scale requires psychological overhaul rather than tinkering, we should not expect much 
variation. The further and further we zoom in on a species, the more variation we may 
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discover. But the features of fundamental psychology are more likely to vary as the basic 
organizational features of Mammalian body plans do; not the way Mammalian body size 
does.  
 I’ll conclude this section by returning to Prinz’s project. The kinds of arguments 
against human nature I consider in this paper would undermine his project just as much 
as they would any nativist. For they are arguments targeted at the uniformity of human 
psychology and not its broad contours. There can be no reinforcement between 
empiricist denials of human nature and evolutionary denials of human nature.  
Morality and Politics 
 In “On Human Nature”, David Hull (1986) notes the following intellectual 
function that human nature can have:“But why is it so important for the human species 
to have a nature? One likely answer is to provide a foundation for ethics and 
morals” (11). As he thinks that human regularities are certain to change over time, he 
says: “I, for one, would be extremely uneasy to base something as important as human 
rights on such temporary contingencies” (4). He also expresses befuddlement that 
people even think that things such as rights need to be based on commonalities at all. 
Still, Hull appeals to evolutionary-based denials of human nature to undercut immoral 
treatment of particular groups of humans. I will quote his thoughts on the topic at 
length (from an earlier paper):  
“On the historical entity interpretation [of species], retarded people are just as 
much instances of Homo sapiens as are their brighter congeners. The same 
can be said for women, blacks, homosexuals, and human fetuses. Some people 
may be incapable of speaking or understanding a genuine language; perhaps 
bees can. It makes no difference. Bees and people remain biologically distinct 
species. On other, nonbiological interpretations of the human species, 
problems arise (and have arisen) with all of the groups mentioned. Possibly 
women and blacks are human beings but do not “participate fully” in human 
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nature. Homosexuals, retardates, and fetuses are somehow less than human. 
And if bees use language, then it seems we run the danger of considering them 
human. The biological interpretation has much to say in its favor, even from 
the humanistic point of view” (Hull 1978, 360).   38
Interpreting his remarks, we can say that Hull proposes to draw the following lessons 
for ethics and politics:  
Instability  There is not enough stability in human features to play a part in 
determining morality and ethics.  
No Normative Classification Biological classification of the human species removes 
any biological reason to classify any member of Homo sapiens as not-properly-human in 
any sense.  
 Let me begin with No Normative Classification. It is certainly true that current 
biology removes any presumed biological basis for classifying large groups of humans in 
hierarchical ways with moral and political significance. And there is certainly something 
very attractive about being able to wipe away any “natural” or biological reason to 
discriminate against historically oppressed groups in one elegant stroke. Furthermore, it 
is a stroke offering insurance against future inventions of groups to discriminate against 
as well. Still, things aren’t quite so simple. Ironically, the arguments for polymorphisms 
may turn into a double-edged sword here. Suppose different “psychmorphs” were 
discovered in human populations. Sad experience suggests we can expect those to come 
along who are motivated to treat one of the psychmorphs in some discriminatory 
manner, and who appeal to evolutionary theory as a basis for treating them as a 
naturally distinct subspecies or “race” of human. Saying that the oppressors could only 
!  The 1986 paper mentions the same groups and expands on the point. 38
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do this based on a misunderstanding of evolution is not to the point. When has 
oppression ever been based on an accurate understanding of biology? 
 Furthermore, holding that every bit of the H. sapiens lineage automatically gets 
the moral status usually associated with “human” may have problematic consequences 
for any being outside that lineage. If that becomes the means for determining moral 
status, it becomes irrelevant what psychological characteristics beings outside the H. 
sapiens lineage possess. The fact that all members of a lineage get grouped together in a 
certain way by biology does not entail that they should all be similarly grouped for moral 
or political purposes. To think otherwise is to exaggerate the reach of biological 
classification once it has been re-conceived in the way Hull envisions. If evolutionary 
theory allows for different types within a lineage at all, it cannot by itself prevent us 
from finding morally relevant differences between the types. It certainly can’t stop those 
who willfully misunderstand or distort biology for depraved purposes from finding 
something to latch on to. 
 The upshot, I think, is that there is no shortcut around substantive moral 
theorizing for telling us what natural traits, differences, etc. are morally relevant and 
what are not. We should not expect a silver bullet from biology to do away with attempts 
to ground odious ethics and politics in biology.   
 Next, it should be clear now, from the previous arguments, that no one has come 
anywhere near establishing something like Instability, the thesis that there is not 
enough stability in human biology for it to play some role in determining the character 
of our ethics or projects of establishing just and flourishing societies. Perhaps more 
importantly, Hull does not give adequate reason to suppose that there is no positive way 
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that general facts about humans can contribute to morality. Suppose, as seems 
plausible, that some suitable ought implies can principle applies to individual human 
morality, and political governance as well. So, for instance, individuals can not be 
morally obligated to do things they cannot do. It is also not a good idea to undertake 
social programs or form political institutions that are doomed to failure. There are 
surely many things that humans cannot do, nor will be able to given any likely course of 
evolution. Further, it may be that there are many such things we are mistaken about or 
unaware of, some of which may conflict with extant moral theories. If so, “the rejection 
of human nature” does not rule out inquiry into what humans are generally like from 
contributing to our moral and political theories.   
 Bottom Line: The denial of human nature cannot straightforwardly undercut 
nefarious appeals to human nature. In fact, it even leaves open the possibility of looking 
for biological differences between groups of humans to base moral theories on. Further, 
it cannot and should not rule out some potentially desirable consequences of using 
human biology and psychology to inform our moral and political philosophies.      
Human Sciences 
 While many philosophers, biologists, psychologists, anthropologists, and other 
scientists have thought that evolutionary theory has profound implications for how we 
approach the human sciences, Hull and Buller think that most such enthusiasm is 
misdirected. They think the discovered lack of human nature ought to reorient the 
human sciences in very different ways. Psychology should cease the search for 
universals (Buller 2005); nor should anthropology search for cultural universals (Hull 
1986). And they suggest ways of reorienting both disciplines away from sciences like 
!89
physics in order to become more “historical” sciences. We’ll look at each to see how they 
overstate their case. 
Buller on Psychology 
 After criticizing certain prominent work in evolutionary psychology, Buller 
(2005) reaffirms the idea that psychology should be based in evolutionary theory, 
properly conceived, and outlines how it would change when set aright. To achieve the 
proper direction, he claims that “…a truly evolutionary psychology should abandon the 
quest for human nature and with it any attempt to discover universal laws of human 
psychology” which latter he equates with “…the quest to be a science in the model of 
physics or chemistry” (419, 457).  
 Buller goes on to accuse the search for universals of a kind of “temporal 
provincialism”, even suggesting that it retains holdovers from theological creationism. 
He claims: “…any psychological universals we might happen to discover in the present 
would not characterize Homo sapiens per se, but would only characterize our species at 
this particular moment in evolutionary time” (477). In light of this situation, he suggests 
that psychology wake up to the realization that “evolutionary theory is purely a process 
theory” addressed at generational change rather than “finished products” (478-9). 
Although he does not go into specifics, it is clear that, somehow, psychology needs to be 
more historically oriented, becoming a science of process and change.  
 There are a number of problems with Buller’s arguments. First, it is bizarre to 
suggest that evolutionary theory, as opposed to physics and chemistry, is directed at 
natural processes and change. Similarly with the implication that psychology does not 
already itself deal with processes and change (consider developmental psychology). It is 
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also misleading to suggest that evolutionary theory is purely aimed at processes. As 
elsewhere in nature, evolutionary processes have certain kinds of outcomes or 
“products”, and not other kinds. Biology is just as concerned with the biological 
outcomes of evolutionary processes as with the processes themselves.   
 With the above in mind, it is also misleading to suggest that biology has become a 
completely “historical” science because of evolution. From microbiology to ecology, 
biology employs categories that are not purely historical in nature (e.g., cell, sexual 
dimorphism, autotroph, predator) and discovers principles of them that are invariant 
across many kinds of evolutionary change (e.g., ratios of biomass of autotrophs to 
heterotrophs in ecosystems). Natural selection itself often drives traits to fixation in 
populations and maintains them at fixation. Hence, far from denying all forms of 
biological “stasis”, in many cases evolutionary theory both predicts and explains it.  
 Next, numerous biological traits and principles operate over a large number of 
species (note that medical and nutritional principles tested on animals such as mice 
often generalize to humans). The same goes for psychology, undercutting Buller’s claims 
that any universal is destined to be temporary. Principles of both associative learning 
and faculties for “core cognition” are operative throughout humans and members of 
other species, many of which are only distantly related to humans (Shettleworth, Heyes, 
Hauser, op. cit.).  
 It is highly likely that some currently typical features of human psychology are 
likely to become (statistically) untypical in future populations. That fact alone does not 
even make it probable that all will. Given what we have learned from comparative 
psychology, many psychological features of humans are likely to remain typical in 
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human populations so long as they exist. And if psychology can discover psychological 
traits and principles that operate universally across species, there is no reason that it 
couldn’t discover some that are both universal and unique within a species. Buller has 
failed to identify a way in which psychology needs to be radically reoriented to 
accommodate the advances of evolutionary theory. It may recommend greater caution 
and higher standards for claims of universality, as well as greater precision in the scope 
of the “universality” being claimed. But it gives us no reason to give up on psychological 
universals tout court. 
Hull on Anthropology 
 Hull claimed a near universal tendency on the part of anthropologists to search 
for cultural universals, and chided them for it. He believed that biology held the 
antidote. He said: “But if genetic variability characterizes species, even though everyone 
is absolutely certain that it does not, then possibly a similar variability characterizes 
cultures, even though the parallel conviction about cultures is, if anything, stronger” (5). 
He explicitly developed the analogy further:  
“My argument is analogical. Both population geneticists and anthropologists 
have been strongly predisposed to discount variability. Genetics is sufficiently 
well developed that geneticists have been forced to acknowledge how variable 
both genes and traits are, both within species and between them. The social 
sciences are not so well developed. Hence, it is easier for them to hold fast to 
their metaphysical preferences” (ibid).  
As an assessment of the field of anthropology, Hull is profoundly one-sided. The most 
historically influential tradition in American anthropology, starting with Franz Boas, 
was characterized by its emphasis on cultural diversity (Degler 1991). However, many of 
the stronger claims of variability and lack of commonality have not stood up to the 
empirical “development” of the field (see e.g., Brown 1991; Pinker 2003). But what is 
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hard to understand is why Hull thinks that whatever variability there is in human 
genetics is relevant as a guide to variability in cultures.  
 Perhaps there is some causal route from the variability of genes that would lead 
us to expect variability among cultures.  For there may be just as much variability in 39
genes involved in psychological development as in anything else. If this variability led to 
variability in psychologies across cultures, and cultures reflect the psychologies of their 
members, then perhaps we should expect to see genetic variation expressed in cultural 
variation.  
 There are many obstacles for the above argument to overcome. But even if it 
turned out to be accurate, so that we should expect to find cross-cultural variability, it 
(once again) does not rule out finding universals amidst the diversity. It could be that 
any sustainable culture requires some broad organizational principles and practices to 
maintain itself and to transmit its knowledge from generation to generation. Further, as 
argued above, there is no reason to think that psychological universals themselves have 
been ruled out by Hull’s considerations. In principle, anthropology could safely proceed 
in simultaneously searching for cultural universals while documenting the array of 
discovered differences.    
Bottom Line: Neither Buller nor Hull give any good reason to suppose that human 
sciences, such as psychology and anthropology, cannot follow physics, chemistry, and 
even biology in employing non-historical categories and discovering broad 
generalizations that make use of them.    
Philosophical Kinship 
!  Hull denies that he is asserting this. But it is not fully clear just why he thinks it is relevant 39
and this is an option at least worth exploring. 
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 In his recent introduction to the philosophy of biology, Peter Godfrey-Smith 
(2014) tries to connect the evolutionary and existentialist approaches to human nature. 
He identifies their commonality as a “post hoc” approach. Specifically, human nature 
talk is always a response to already established human phenomena that are, in some 
sense, changeable and open-ended. From the existentialist side,  he quotes Sartre:  
“What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that 
man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world—and defines 
himself afterwards” (Sartre 1945; quoted in Godfrey-Smith 2014, 143). 
Godfrey-Smith interprets Sartre as holding that “there is no human nature that does or 
should constrain the actual facts of human behavior and choice. Humans are what they 
make of themselves” (142). He then immediately connects this with how he had earlier 
characterized “evolved natures” as post hoc, suggesting endorsement. The earlier 
characterization is as follows: 
“Once evolution in a lineage has actually taken a particular path for a while, 
we can talk about an “evolved nature” that has been established in that 
lineage, though much of it will not be universal, even at a time. As evolution is 
open-ended, this talk about our nature has a post hoc character” (142).      
There is a simple, literal interpretation of Sartre’s and Godfrey-Smith’s claims that is 
true, but uninteresting. All talk of natures, whether human, biological, or otherwise, 
occurs after humans have begun to exist, evolved, and “surged” up in the world. Before 
them, there was no one else to do it. The important question, though, is one of whether 
that talk latches on to genuine discovery of non-arbitrary groupings of phenomena. The 
fact that evolution can change currently universal features of kinds of organisms is what 
makes zeroing in on all current universals appear to have an element of arbitrariness 
and, hence, be post hoc. But this open-endedness of evolution occurs throughout the 
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biological realm. And the existentialists intended to distinguish humans from the rest of 
life by means of their “self-made” characteristics.  
 Godfrey-Smith recognizes the “universality” of the open-ended nature of 
evolution, and so suggests that “The capacities for learning and cultural transmission 
seen in humans give this evolutionary openness an extra dimension” (142). It is doubtful 
whether this really connects with any existentialist viewpoint, particularly Sartre’s. For 
Sartre, it wasn’t any peculiar capacity for learning, but a particularly powerful kind of 
freedom to impose meaning that gave humans their self-making capacity (Sartre 1945). 
And many of the human tendencies involved in cultural transmission would be 
understood by Sartre as expressions of “bad faith”, or tendencies of humans to disown 
their freedom (Sartre 1943). Furthermore, while the main motivation behind 
evolutionary denials of human nature stems from its emphasis on diversity and a lack of 
unity in the H. sapiens lineage, Sartre thought all humans were unified by their powers 
of “nature-transcendence” (1945).   
 The tendency to think of human flexibility and control over their lives and 
environments as a threat to traditional notions of human nature does not actually begin 
with the existentialists. Kant and Marx are two towering figures of the modern era who 
held views of this kind.  Anthropologists, particularly in the American tradition, also 40
argued for similar views (Degler 1991). Advances in biology and the human sciences tell 
!  For Kant, see his 1798, 1786, and Wood’s 2007 interpretation. For Marx, see his 1845, 1846. 40
See Solomon 1972 for an explanation of Kant’s profound historical influence on the rise of 
existentialism.  
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us that the extent of human plasticity, flexibility, and self-control has almost certainly 
been exaggerated in these various traditions.   41
 Still, it should not be denied that humans have more, or a higher-degree of, “self-
making” capacity than other creatures. Spelling out just what this comes to in much 
more clear and precise terms remains as an important task for philosophy and the 
human sciences. The way I see it, there remains a need to adequately characterize the 
extent and limits of human self-making, at both individual and collective levels, as well 
as a need to then explain what gets so characterized. The importance of the conceptual 
and theoretical reorientation accomplished by evolutionary thinking to these tasks 
resides more in the theoretical possibilities it brings into view for these tasks, rather 
than anything it tells us about human beings in particular. Any convergence between 
evolution-based and other philosophical denials of human nature is purely nominal, and 
thinly so, at best.  
 Bottom Line: The rationale behind evolutionary denials of human nature bears 
no significant similarity to other philosophical movements that call into question the 
very notion of human nature. The former denial is based in facts that humans have had 
no control over, while the latter sorts of denials are based in an appreciation for what 
control humans do have, or at least appear to have.                     
Conclusion 
!  Pinker 2003 remains a useful documentation of this, even if somewhat exaggerated. Banaji 41
and Greenwald 2013, Kahneman 2011, and Wilson 2002 are excellent summaries of the 
psychological evidence indicating just how much inflexibility, opacity, and bias pervades the 
human mind. Even the bastion of Kantian and Sartrean freedom is riddled with error, illusion, 
and inability to command a clear view of its own limitations.   
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 The strength of the evolutionary case against human nature has been greatly 
exaggerated. To delegitimize any talk of human nature in the biological and human 
sciences requires much stronger premises than deniers of human nature have either 
recognized or adequately argued for. Alternatively, the arguments that may rule out 
certain, misguided conceptions of human nature from the past have relatively weak 
consequences. They don’t have the implications for currently live issues that they have 
been thought to have. Furthermore, answers to important questions relevant to the 
issue have been assumed rather than treated as topics for investigation in their own 
right. One such issue is the actual extent of variation in human populations and how to 
adequately characterize its co-existence with uniformity in the same populations. This 
may seem like a straightforwardly empirical question. It certainly has a large empirical 
component to it. But the fact that it continually arises in debates across the human 
sciences suggests that philosophers may have an opportunity to contribute to making 
progress on the issue. If the debate over human nature in philosophy of biology helps 
bring focus and clarity to this issue, then that will be one fruitful consequence of its 
legacy.    
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SHIFTING ATTENTION ON TRANSFORMATIVE CHOICE: THE ROLE OF 
WORTHWHILENESS IN MAKING THE LEAP  42
Introduction 
 In recent work, L. A. Paul (2015; 2014) has argued that some important 
decisions, such as whether to become a parent, cannot be made rationally when 
approached in a common way. We can neither rationally choose for or against these 
particular actions. The reason is that we have no rational basis for evaluating certain 
ways we will be affected by the consequences of our choice. Rational basis is missing 
when our choices involve undergoing dramatically new kinds of experiences and those 
experiences change our preferences and values in ways we cannot anticipate. These 
experiences are both epistemically and personally transforming. In Paul’s words: 
“Any epistemically transformative experience that changes the self enough to 
generate a deep phenomenological transformation creates significant trouble 
for the hope that we could use our ordinary subjective perspective to make 
rational decisions about major life events (2015, 22)”.  43
The problem is that transformative experiences create values that are inaccessible to the 
inexperienced, values that the inexperienced person needs in order to make a decision 
about whether to become experienced or not.  
 There are two general ways of responding to Paul’s problem. One is to try to show 
that the purportedly inaccessible values are somewhat accessible after all. This strategy 
has been pursued from different angles in some of the forthcoming commentary on 
Paul’s work (Barnes, forthcoming; Dougherty, Horowitz, Sliwa, forthcoming; Pettigrew, 
!  I am grateful to Ned Hall, Bernhard Nickel, L. A. Paul, Susanna Siegel, and Susanna Rinard 42
for very helpful discussion on this paper and its topics. 
!  For Paul, “deep phenomenological transformation” implies personal transformation. 43
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forthcoming). A different strategy grants, at least provisionally, the inaccessibility of the 
values and proposes alternative bases for making the decision. This is Paul’s own 
strategy, and the one I engage with her on in this paper. Her proposed decision base is 
the value we place on discovery of inaccessible values. I raise two problems for this 
proposal, one of which is a major challenge to any alternative proposal. I propose a way 
to meet the challenge through including in our decision base the values we place on the 
inherent worthwhileness of the transformed identities, activities, and relationships.  
First, I turn to an explanation of Paul’s problem and how to understand its force.  
Paul on Transformative Experience 
 What, exactly, are these inaccessible values? They are the values we attach to the 
phenomenological features of brand new experiences. Their inaccessibility stems from 
the fact that the phenomenology of a type of experience is epistemically blocked from all 
but subjects having the experience.  If you have never eaten insects before (a common 
food in many parts of the world), you’re first bite into a grasshopper will reveal to you 
what it is like to taste grasshoppers. Experiences of new tastes, sights, sounds, feelings, 
emotions, etc., are ‘revelatory’ in that they reveal to us the intrinsic character of new 
phenomenal states (2014, 13). They have further epistemically transformative properties 
in that they also endow us with new capacities of imagination and recognition (2014, 
10).  
 As Paul notes, we value our experiences, especially new ones, and they “carry 
weight in our decision making” (2014, 11). While such values will include hedonistic 
ones of pleasure and pain, they are not limited to them. Paul argues that additional 
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values we attach to the intrinsic sensory, affective, and cognitive character of 
phenomenal states are “primitive”--not reducible to anything else, including hedonistic 
values (2014, 11-12, 93). She says: “Because I take such values ... to capture the rich, 
complex nature of lived experiences resulting from our sensory as well as our 
nonsensory cognitive phenomenology, I will describe them as subjective values” (12, 
original emphasis).  This gives a good sense for the rich approach Paul takes to our 44
experiential lives and how we value them. But I wish to avoid potential confusion that 
may result from labeling these values ‘subjective’. All values in decision-theoretic 
contexts, not just those assigned to experiences, are “subjective” in the sense that they 
are assigned from the point of view of the decision making subject. So I prefer to use 
“experiential values”, but will mean by it exactly what Paul does in her use of “subjective 
values”.  
 Let me be clear that what is ‘inaccessible‘ to a decision making subject in the first 
instance are the phenomenal states ‘on the other side’ of the epistemically 
transformative experience she is considering. Paul’s crucial contention is that there is a 
rational constraint on the assignment of values to those experiential states. The 
constraint is that we have to be subjectively acquainted with revelatory states in order to 
be justified in forming preferences concerning them, or to assign specific decision 
!  Paul places significant emphasis on cognitive phenomenology and takes for granted its non-44
reducibility to any kind of sensory phenomenology (2014, 12). She does not, however, address 
the fact that this is a very controversial assumption in philosophy of mind (though she does cite 
Bayne and Montague [2011] where the controversy is on full display). It would be interesting to 
know what she thinks about how her project would be affected by the outcome of this 
controversy. However, although I can’t argue it here, I think her inaccessibility problem can be 
generated without such reliance on cognitive phenomenology.   
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making weights to them.  This is the primary sense in which experiential values are 45
inaccessible for Paul: even if we can denote and talk about them ourselves (perhaps 
because of testimony), we cannot rationally assign them for ourselves without the 
proper, first-personal epistemic acquaintance. There is fairly strong intuitive backing for 
this claim. If you were to ask me which I prefer, vegemite (a spread) or durian (a fruit) 
[examples used by Paul], I would respond that I cannot say for I have never tried either. 
And it would be unreasonable for you to demand of me that I go ahead and form a 
preference anyway.  
 Despite the inaccessibility of the taste of durian, it doesn’t seem irrational for me 
to decide to try it. I want to find out what it tastes like, and past experience with 
hundreds of new tastes gives me considerable confidence that it will not be so bad as to 
egregiously displease or harm me (see Paul 2014, 15 and 37-39). Things change, though, 
when I must decide whether to undergo a transformative experience that is much more 
foreign and has much greater consequences than tasting a new fruit. Decisions like 
whether or not to parent can potentially change the very basis on which I make value 
judgments, reconfiguring my whole preference structure. They may deeply affect my 
sense of self, the very character of what it is like to be me. When experiences have this 
outcome, they are personally transformative in addition to being epistemically so (2014, 
16; 2015, 8). Becoming a parent; going to college; living amidst an unfamiliar culture; 
religious conversion; becoming clinically depressed: these are illustrative examples of 
personally transformative experiences.  
!  I find the best statement of this to be the whole last paragraph of page 13 of her 2015. Of 45
course, it is an ongoing theme in both the paper and the book. 
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 The first important thing to note about how personally transformative 
experiences differ from minimally epistemic ones like trying new tastes is how much 
higher the stakes are. With a new taste, we know that the potential effects are acceptably 
limited or containable. With a major life decision like parenting, however, we know that 
the effects, both objective and subjective, can be far-reaching. With so much at stake, we 
want more information to be able to make the right decision. But unfortunately there is 
even less; or, rather, there is more ignorance. There is more ‘breadth’ to the ignorance: 
the novel kinds and aspects of phenomenal experience for a new parent greatly 
outnumber those of a new taste.  
 There is also a special kind of ‘depth‘ to the ignorance. Whereas my current 
psychology is “primed and ready” for the experience of tasting durian, it is not so ready 
to hear the cries and coos of an infant as communicative signals of the current well-
being of my child. My psychology is as yet unable to adequately process such an 
experience and evaluate it properly. Until I have undergone many hormonal and 
neuronal changes that will affect my senses, desires, and preferences, some of the 
transformed experience of parenting will be ‘doubly’ inaccessible to me. If I had an 
‘experience-scope‘ to peer into the mind of a parent, some of it may be like watching a 
Japanese Noh play to the uninitiated--I would flounder to even make sense of what was 
happening. And so without the transformed psychological apparatus that comes with 
being a parent, there is a sense in which the values attaching to parental experience are 
deeply indeterminate for my current psychology in a way that the value of tasting durian 
is not (see Paul 2014, 48-9). In the next section I will discuss in more detail what Paul 
thinks this means for rational decision making.    
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Paul on Contemporary Decision Making 
 Paul holds that a decision is rational only if made in accordance with what she 
calls realistic normative decision theory (2014, 19-20). For her this means standard 
Bayesian decision theory tailored in whatever way needed to be usable for beings with 
our cognitive capacities and limitations.  And, though she affirms that “maximizing 46
expected value is the way to go” in matters of rationality, decision theory cannot be 
sufficient for rationality without qualification for her (2014, 114).  This is because she 47
has the constraint of epistemic acquaintance on rational formation for experiential 
preferences that we noted above. So that constraint needs to be included in the total list 
of jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for rational decision making. Still, with 
that in mind, we can state Paul’s problem of inaccessible values in decision-theoretic 
terms:  
No Output 
If the basis for a personally transformative decision consists of transformed 
experiential values, then decision theory yields no expected values for the decision 
options.   
The reason for No Output is that the relevant experiential values are inaccessible and 
so we are not ‘in possession’ of values to plug into the decision-theoretic calculus. 
Without the proper inputs, we cannot get the needed outputs. A decision problem that 
!  She mentions Weirich (2004) as a good source for how to approach this.  46
!  Note that she uses “expected value” rather than the oft used “expected utility”. This is purely 47
notational as far as I can tell and will follow her in it. At the very least it does not signal a 
departure with standard decision theory that need concern us. 
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cannot get expected value outputs from decision theory cannot be solved rationally by 
anyone taking decision theory to be necessary for rational decision making.   48
 The antecedent of No Output mentions a basis for transformative decisions. 
What determines what values to base a decision on? Paul cites a contemporary cultural 
ideal, claiming it is the reigning cultural paradigm for how to make decisions like the 
parenting one (2015, 12; 2014, 25). Whereas people in other times and places relied on 
values of economic necessity or cultural values of preserving family status, many 
contemporary Western societies enshrine ideals of personal fulfillment and self-
realization (2015, 21; 2014, 84). She interprets these ideals as directing us to base 
transformative decisions on “...what it will be like for us to experience the outcome of 
our acts...” (2014, 25). That is, our attention to experiential values is being directed by 
commitment to a well-entrenched ideal of self-realization.   
 Another route to experiential values comes from Paul’s interpretation of a natural 
way for us to make decisions which is by imagining different “subjective futures” that 
could result from our decisions (2014, see esp. 33 and 52). Paul speaks of this as 
cognitive modeling, wherein we “evaluate ... experiential outcomes” of our possible acts 
by mentally simulating “...what it would be like for (us) to have each of these 
!  Pettigrew (forthcoming) proposes a way to formally model the uncertainty involved that 48
challenges No Output. At best, the model shows that it would be too quick to suggest that there 
are any deep, novel problems here for ideal decision theory. But the model is highly unrealistic 
for everyday decision making that employs a suitably real-life-agent-tailored decision-theoretic 
calculus. Even then, I’m not sure that it does get ideal decision theory off the hook, for it 
assumes a method for weighting temporally indexed utility functions that needs cashing out (see 
Paul’s forthcoming response). In any case, if my proposal here works, it provides a realistic way 
of gaining traction over the uncertainty in transformative decisions that allows us to avoid the 
challenges of employing Pettigrew’s model. Thanks to Susanna Rinard and Ned Hall for 
discussion here. 
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experiences” (26). It is important to be aware of these two sources of focus on 
experiential values to know where to return to when we call into question that focus.  
 Note that the previously mentioned antecedent contains “consists”, indicating 
that only experiential values are part of the decision base. This will be important to how 
we think about addressing the problem of inaccessible values--whether to completely 
replace them, or just force them to cede room to other, accessible values. In this paper, I 
will be assuming, along with Paul, that we cannot simply ignore or replace inaccessible 
experiential values. The problems I raise for both Paul’s and my own proposed solution 
depend on it. But this means that whatever additional or alternative values are 
incorporated, the decision-theoretic issue of how to deal with unassigned values that 
ought to be part of the calculus will arise. This issue will have to remain in the 
background for the remainder of this paper, though. We need to get other proposals all 
the way on to the table before we address the logistics of decision-theoretic calculation.  
 Two issues concerning decision making remain before we can get to potential 
solutions to our problem. The first is Paul’s commitment to another norm for decision 
making. In addition to making them rationally, she thinks we should make decisions 
authentically. This ideal asks that we strive for ‘faithful’ representation of our desires, 
values, and preferences (2014, 105). That is, we resist or root-out self-deception and 
willful self-ignorance. Additionally, it asks that we retain autonomy and authority over 
our decision making and refuse to cede it to alien sources (2014, 130). For Paul, this has 
the consequence that we cannot replace our own doomed first-personal efforts at 
accessing the inaccessible with scientific findings (possible in the future, though not 
advanced enough now). She wants neither “Big Data” nor “Big Morality” to replace 
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“personal deliberation and authentic choice” (2014, 130). I am in broad agreement with 
Paul on this and my own proposal is intended to respect authenticity so conceived. As I 
said in the introduction, I will not be concerned with any ways of rendering the 
inaccessible values more epistemically accessible.   49
 Finally, Paul is only concerned with transformative choices that are not decided 
morally, legally, empirically, prudentially, or economically (2014, 18, 112; 2015, 1). Once 
all those kinds of considerations are in, there must be options left over which people can 
rationally disagree about. Rationality by the lights of decision theory, after all, allows 
different people to choose differently in the same decision problem. In the search for 
alternative bases to making transformative choices, we should look for general guiding 
ideals over which people can disagree in the particulars. Self-realization meets this test--
different people will choose alternative routes to self-realization and each may be 
rational.  
 Now we should have a good grasp on Paul’s problem of inaccessible values and 
how it threatens the rationality of personally transformative choices. The problem can 
be persuasively articulated both informally and in the context of standard decision 
theory. We should also have an awareness of important nuances in the structure of the 
problem to help us think about what is needed to meet the problem and evaluate 
whether different proposals can do so. I turn to that task in the remainder of the paper.    
Paul’s Solution: Discovery of Experience 
!  However, I do think that there are options for reconciling a reliance on scientific evidence 49
with the value of authenticity that Paul does not consider. But that will have to await another 
occasion. 
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 Paul’s response to the problem of the inaccessibility of transformed values is to 
propose the discovery solution. She says we can rationally approach the problem by 
asking ourselves how much we value revelation for its own sake. In the choice between 
parenting and not, do we prefer discovering what it would be like to be parents to being 
forever ignorant? Do we value discovery enough to override the value of what it is like to 
be us in our childless states? If not, then we should forego parenting. Similarly for any 
decision in which transformation is a live option. How much do we value discovering the 
results of the transformation?   
 Discovery has value for virtually everyone to some extent. Paul notes Aristotle’s 
essential insight in this connection: “All men by nature desire to know. An indication of 
this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are 
loved for themselves...” (quoted on pg. 92 0f her 2014). We all know people driven by 
exploration and discovery. Science depends on them. “Now I can say that I’ve had the 
experience of Xing”; “I’ve always wanted to try Y” are phrases commonly heard for 
numerous and various X and Y. Discovery value also has the advantage of being one we 
recognize different people having to varying extents. It doesn’t dictate that each person 
should parent, or refrain from parenting. And this is a result we want.  
 Approaching transformative decisions through discovery values is not simply like 
deciding whether to try bungee jumping. Though there may be some parallels, Paul 
emphasizes that the decisions cannot be reduced to sensory discovery or thrill: “If you 
choose to have the transformative experience, to choose rationally, you must prefer to 
discover whether and how your preferences will change” (2014, 118) [mutatis mutandis 
for choosing against transformation]. One must be fully aware that currently cherished 
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first-order preferences, perhaps ones for sensory adventure and discovery, may be lost. 
Other important things are at risk as well: “...the decision to have a child could be 
understood as a decision to discover a radically new way of living with correspondingly 
new preferences, whether your subjective well-being increases or not” (2014, 119). As 
she says, “...you choose [transformation] in order to discover who you’ll become”, where 
this could be different in quite significant respects from who you are now (ibid). One 
must value discovery highly indeed. But such discovery, of fundamental changes in one’s 
sense of self, may be one of the privileges of being human.  
 Discovery values have further advantages from Paul’s point of view. For one, they 
are not inaccessible. We have all had the experience of discovering something or other. 
Revelatory experiences made up significant parts of our lives from infancy through 
adolescence. If Aristotle was right, there may be some native basis for valuing discovery 
and so it may make little sense to question its rationality. Hence, we have rational 
preferences right here and now for discovery. We need not pretend to know enough to 
value that which we aim to discover. Nor do we need science or other testimony to tell us 
how much we value discovery. We are not alienated from how much we value discovery. 
Additionally, we may have had personally transformative experiences in the past. 
Anyone who has gone through puberty knows what it is like to be transformed. And 
while that may not have been a choice, it provided a store of transformative experience 
to assist us in forming values for discovering personal transformation. Basing 
transformative choice on mindful consideration of the value of transformation discovery 
thus seems to have much to recommend to it. Unfortunately, it has significant problems 
of its own.  
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Troubles with Discovery 
 In this section I will raise two worries for the recommendation to make 
transformative choice rational via the consideration of the value of discovery. I call them 
the guidance problem and the gravity problem. I will begin with the guidance problem 
and consider some possible responses to it. I conclude that none are likely to succeed. 
Then I turn to the gravity problem.  
Guidance 
 Recall that the discovery solution Paul recommends requires basing 
transformative choices on the value of transformative discovery per se. She says it: “The 
idea is that if you choose revelation, you choose it for its own sake” (118). And it is 
required by both her view and the nature of discovery: you choose to discover 
epistemically inaccessible things which have inaccessible values. But the value of 
discovery as such cannot help you decide whether to discover X, Y, or Z, where these are 
mutually incompatible options. It can only help you decide between discovery and 
foregoing discovery. Hence, from the point of view of discovery, you should be 
indifferent between discovery of what it is like to become a parent and discovery of what 
it is like to become a celibate monk. It cannot tell you whether to discover who you 
would become as a lawyer or to discover a future self as a dentist. It is not that it values 
them in different, incomparable ways. The value of discovery simply has nothing to say. 
It can give you no guidance amidst the array of alternative transformations. 
Possible Responses 
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 The value of discovery can help us decide when the decision problem has been 
legitimately delimited like so: to discover or not discover. The problem is that it cannot 
guide us in situations where we must choose between alternative paths of discovery, and 
those are more realistically the sorts of situations we find ourselves in, e.g., choosing 
career paths. I want to now consider some possible responses on behalf of the discovery 
theorist. Two kinds of response I examine fall under the category of augmentation 
strategies. Such strategies seek to retain discovery as the primary motivating value, but 
pare down the space of alternative discoveries through additional considerations and 
values. The second category of strategy, a ‘dogmatic’ or ‘dig-in-your-heels’ one, insists 
on the rationality of ‘brute’ preferences for the discovery of X over the discovery of Y. In 
each case I find the strategy unable to deliver.         50
 Augmentation Strategy #1 Suppose you have a very strong first-order 
preference, along with a higher-order preference that it not be changed. You also value 
discovery strongly, but not enough to change the other first-order preference. In other 
words, you value discovery enough to be willing to change some first-order preferences, 
but not all. Then you can rule out all the discovery options for which there is a 
significant chance your highly valued first-order preference would either be changed or 
continually frustrated.  
 Let’s start with my example of parenthood versus monkhood. A response to it 
following the above strategy would be to say that preferences concerning sexual activity 
are both rational and strong enough to rule out discovery of experiential values resulting 
from changes in them. This kind of response may work against this particular example. 
!  I’m grateful to Susanna Siegel for discussion that helped motivate my formulation of the 50
possible responses here. 
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But it cannot do much broader work. The space of potentially transformative choices is 
not significantly restricted by fixing and respecting the strength of basic sexual 
preferences (e.g., for some sex over none). Choice of career is one domain that is not 
plausibly so restricted. With that in mind, it is also worth considering how Paul’s 
argument for inaccessible values more directly confronts the response.  
 If you think that you know you would not sufficiently value the experience of 
living the life of a celibate monk, you are not yet convinced by Paul’s inaccessibility 
arguments. The whole point is that personal transformation changes you in ways that 
you cannot adequately anticipate and so reject out of hand. This is no less true for 
becoming a parent than for becoming a monk. Choosing to remain childless requires 
choosing to reject experiential values for which you have no basis of rejection (or 
acceptance). It is exactly the same for deciding to reject monkhood. If you became a 
monk, your first-order preferences and values would change in such a way as to change 
how you value certain experiences. As a monk, you may come to enjoy cognitive and 
affective phenomenology that is incompatible with sexual activity and develop a strong 
preference for it. If Paul’s argument is correct, cognitive modeling of the subjectivity of a 
monk-future cannot do what you think it can. You simply allow one of your higher-order 
preferences (the one not to change your first-order sexual preferences) to legislate 
against that which you do not yet know how to evaluate (monkish preferences). And this 
runs afoul of the constraint that rational preferences should range over options we are 
justified in evaluating.    
 Perhaps sexual, and similarly strong preferences, are special cases where 
rationality may permit a principle of conservatism for current preferences. Giving up sex 
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may be closer to giving up food than, say, giving up a certain percentage of sleep or a 
certain amount of solitude. Just as it is rationally permissible for anyone to prefer eating 
food to not, it should be rationally permissible for anyone to prefer their current sexual 
preferences to drastically altered ones (except, perhaps, if they clash with morality). We 
certainly do not want Paul’s inaccessibility argument to prove too much. Paul doesn’t 
think our preferences change so much that we cannot rationally prefer parenting to a 
lifetime of excruciating physical torture. Some things about our preferences and values 
stay fixed across personal transformations.  
 Even if we deem it acceptable, rational deference to certain kinds of preferences 
can only restrict domains of discovery options so much. Discovery values plus plausible 
conservation principles are not going to decide between parenting versus foster 
parenting, for instance, though there are many possible differences in the experiential 
values to be discovered. There is a general lesson in the vicinity as well. If the goal is to 
use non-discovery values to pare the discovery space down to one or a few discovery 
options, what makes us think that we can or should stop the process there? Why not 
think that we can find some principle or reason to make the decision without having to 
appeal to discovery values at all?  
 While I cannot prove that it couldn’t happen, it seems highly improbable that my 
current preference set plus constraints on rationality determine a decision problem 
where all but one discovery path has been excluded and all that remains is whether to 
discover X or avoid discovering X. Rather, the more we use non-discovery values to rule 
out possible transformations as live choices, the more we should raise our confidence 
that transformational decisions can be made without appeal to discovery values at all. 
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And, if we are doing this while respecting Paul’s accessibility constraint on values, the 
more we are undermining the problem that motivated the discovery solution in the first 
place. That is, we are appealing to values other than the experiential (and inaccessible) 
ones dictated by the ideals of personal fulfillment and self-realization. If other relevant 
values besides experiential or discovery ones are ready to hand, then it is hard to see 
what motivates Paul’s problem in the first place.   
 Augmentation Strategy #2 Another augmenting option would recommend 
values or preferences more germane to discovery itself. These would be rules for 
‘virtuous’ discovery, so to speak, rather than elimination of discovery options via non-
discovery preferences. One example of such a rule might be to prefer the kinds of 
discoveries that people around you choose: the culturally salient options for discovery. 
Perhaps becoming a celibate monk just isn’t a culturally salient route to transformative 
discovery. Cultural salience correlates with a lot of desirable features: camaraderie, 
support, sharing. Humans are a social species that do things in social contexts. 
Discovery should be thought of in a social way. We value society with other transformed 
people. The consideration of discovery value should respect that.  
 If preferences for fellow travelers in transformation is all that matters, solitary 
endeavors such as being a hermit will be ruled out, but this will be a small percentage of 
the total transformation space. If the preference is for continued society with one’s own 
culture or sub-culture or family or friend-group, it is hard to see how these are really 
virtues properly thought of as attaching to the value of discovery itself. The person who 
prefers to travel to foreign lands and pursue transformation among a new culture cannot 
be violating rules of virtuous discovery. Once again, too, the preference for discovery-in-
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one’s-own-cultural-sphere is not likely to significantly delimit transformational 
possibilities. Career choice remains a good example here. The cultures in which personal 
fulfillment and self-realization are such high ideals are also ones where, often, many 
differentially transformative career options are available.  
 Perhaps the most plausible candidate for a rule of virtuous discovery is that 
discovery choices not be self-undermining. I suppose there are multiple possible ways to 
be self-undermining. With many values, one obvious way for it to happen is when the 
acquisition of some prevents the acquisition of more.  For many values, more is better 
(up to certain limits, often). Pleasure is a good example. Other things equal, x+1 units of 
pleasure is better than x units. But if one way of obtaining pleasure prevented you from 
gaining more pleasure, or diminished your capacity to do so, that would be a “bad” way 
of obtaining pleasure--it would be in some sense contrary to the aims of obtaining 
pleasure. This is one reason certain types of drug use are risky or dangerous. They are 
pursuits of pleasure that can ultimately destroy or diminish your ability to obtain 
pleasure.  
 It is plausible that the value of discovery is like this. We are not satisfied with one 
discovery. We are usually not satisfied with one, or a few, revelatory discoveries. If, on 
the basis of past experience, we value the discovery involved in personal transformation, 
it seems we must value more than one such discovery. If so, then we should choose to 
discover personal transformations that do not inhibit our ability to discover further 
personal transformations. We should choose against personal transformations that 
require taking on moral obligations and commitments that would be violated by another 
personal transformation. From the point of view of transformation discovery, we should 
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choose against transformations that are likely to extinguish or reverse the preference for 
discovery of transformation. But I take it that the value of discovery was not proposed to 
be a means for ruling transformative choices out in this kind of way.  
 Many personal transformations, e.g., parenthood, require long-term, even life-
long, commitments and responsibilities that rule out further personal transformation. 
So the value of discovery might actually end up recommending against certain 
transformations that Paul thought it could rationally justify. Becoming a parent may be 
one. To rationally choose transformations requiring such commitment, we would need 
to appeal to values besides discovery. Unless, of course, there is a brute preference for 
discovering transformations requiring long term commitments. I consider appeals to 
moves like that next.        
 Digging-In What about an approach that ‘digs-in’ on basic discriminating 
discovery values? My preference for discovery of X over Y is basic. And it doesn’t need 
further support. After all, rational decision theory must take preferences as basic at 
some point. Furthermore, we do accept some basic discovery preferences. Some people 
just prefer to discover truths of social insect ecology to discovering truths of black hole 
formation. Some people prefer to discover the experience of skiing to the experience of 
playing basketball. That’s all there is to it. Perhaps my argument that discovery is silent 
threatens to prove too much. It threatens to undermine all the virtues of discovery that 
were previously noted. I can’t claim both the earlier noted virtues and that it is impotent 
to guide us.  
 Some desires and preferences may indeed be basic or ‘brute’. A drive to find out 
about the world may indeed be one of them. But such a ‘discovery drive’ is something 
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different than a preference to discover a specific kind of personal transformation over 
another. Discovery can get us into trouble and so the desire to do it needs guidance. The 
kinds of cases mentioned in the previous paragraph are not usually best explained by a 
basic and unquestionable preference for the discovery of X over the discovery of Y. 
Rather, people’s personal histories, including past experiences, will play a role in 
explaining what shaped such preferences. To the extent that basic desires play an 
explanatory role, they are more likely to be ones that are not best described as such fine-
grained discovery preferences. Given our biology, in most cases, a simple desire to 
parent will be far more comparatively basic than a desire to discover parental 
transformation. The claim that there are basic yet rational preferences for discovery of 
some kinds of personal transformation to others just isn’t plausible.  
 The fact that discovery cannot guide us in realistic transformative decision 
situations is reason enough to continue searching for other values that can. But it faces 
another problem that is worth considering because meeting it may be a significant 
challenge for any candidate value-bases for transformative decision making. I turn to 
that problem, the “gravity problem”, next.   
Gravity  51
 Prior to hearing Paul’s arguments for the unavailability of a whole class of values, 
one might be taken aback by the suggestion that we should base the parenting decision 
on the value of discovery. There is so much at stake: hundreds of thousands of dollars; 
thousands of hours of sleep; opportunities of all kinds; the existence of human beings. 
Are we really to believe that all of it could turn only on what we think about learning 
!  I am grateful to Bernhard Nickel for discussion of ideas that led to my framing of this 51
problem. 
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new things? It can seem as though the recommendation does not respect the gravity of 
the decision: almost like flipping a coin to decide a Supreme Court case.  
 Remember that the experiential values to be discovered remain unknown prior to 
revelatory experience of them. But they retain their potential “heft” in decision making, 
as when we were thinking about the problem before the consideration of discovery 
values. This means the discoverer will still have to live with the discovered experiential 
values and the person who rejects transformation must live with rejecting the values 
even if she does it on the basis of a preference against discovery.  The whole reason that 52
personal transformation is supposed to be a problem that does not arise for the 
discovery of new tastes is that the transformation has a kind of weightiness and level of 
consequence that the other does not. The weightiness concerns the very shape and 
contour of one’s personal identity. Can the value of sheer discovery, even discovery of 
personal transformation, really rise to that level of seriousness? 
 To make this point more precise, let’s compare how the discovery solution fares 
with novel kinds of tastes, like durian. As Paul herself notes, we have tried new fruits 
before and that gives us important information (2014, 38-39). We know that the 
probability of a new taste having a dramatically negative effect on us is very small. We 
know that any transformation will almost assuredly be very restricted, leaving our core 
values and preferences intact. Another way of putting this is that we are confident that 
the inaccessible experiential values of tasting a new fruit are very few in number, and 
!  There are several places where Paul writes of the potential for one set of values to “swamp” 52
another set (e.g., 2014, 42-43; 73n.28; 75; 163). This seems to be her version of the issues I am 
grouping under what I call the gravity problem, though there may be differences. In her terms, 
then, I argue that it is implausible that discovery values could swamp inaccessible experiential 
values. At least in many cases, such as parenting.  
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each one occupies a narrow range of possible values with upper and lower bounds that 
are themselves small in comparison to our cherished values. Let me explain in more 
detail.   
 In the case of durian there are at least two revelatory aspects: the intrinsic 
character of the flavor, and its place on a distastefulness-deliciousness intensity scale 
(2014, 35). Let’s allow for rich phenomenology and throw in a couple more values that 
are only accessed once we taste durian for the first time.  So we’ll suppose there are 4 53
such inaccessible values. By comparison, the other side of a personally transformative 
experience conceals far more new experiences. Let’s stick with the parenting example. 
The experience of parenting will include new feelings, moods, and affective states, both 
positively and negatively valenced. If Paul is right, it will contain all kinds of new 
cognitive phenomenology--new kinds of thoughts and understanding of the world, 
relationships, and so on. There will be new desires to deal with. Perceptual experience 
may change as well. You may begin to see things as threats to your children, for 
instance. The new kinds of experiences Paul thinks we may have are typed very finely. 
Cognitive concern for children is revelatory in comparison to cognitive concern for loved 
ones besides children (Paul, personal communication). All considered, I think 30 
inaccessible values is probably a conservative estimate of what awaits on the other side 
of many personal transformations. And that is a sufficient number to make my 
comparative point.  
 Now let’s think about a value scale. Let it have a true zero point and let me 
propose some orienting values to provide some kind of anchoring. I’ll consider breaking 
!  Paul might say there are even more (see her 2014,163). My purpose is to make a comparative 53
point, though, and so this is sufficient as a rough estimate. 
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one’s leg as a really negative event and attending a beautiful, joyful wedding full of 
friends and family as a highly positive event. I don’t claim any but the most rough ball 
park figures for all quantitative values below. My aim will be satisfied if I can provide a 
sense for what is involved in weighing discovery values against what could transpire 
through a transformation like becoming a parent.       
Breaking Leg: -400    Wedding: +600 
 In comparison, I think the possible values associated with the taste of a fruit 
would be much smaller. In my case, I would say the upper bound would be 10 and the 
lower bound -10. Given my allowance for four different values, that’s a possibility of 
having an experience of -40 upon tasting durian. In comparison to the point I set for 
breaking a leg, I think I’m being generous to the power of durian to displease me. In any 
case, I would need to value the discovery of the experience at something greater than 40 
to guarantee that the experience would be worth it for me. That also seems like a lot, but 
let’s grant it for now. So let us assume the following figures for tasting something like 
durian for the first time: 
New Taste: 4 inaccessible values. Lower bound: -10 Upper Bound: +10.  
Discovery value for each inaccessible state: +11  
 Under these conditions, it would always be rational for me to try durian. Now 
let’s try an analogous exercise for personally transformed experience.  It is not clear how 
allowable Paul thinks this is, or what the rules are for doing it (see 2014, 156-7). But it 
seems to me like there ought to be some way of quantitatively portraying the asymmetry 
Paul thinks there is between purely epistemic transformation and personal 
transformation. The numbers I choose are only meant to do that and should not be 
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taken to imply any unwarranted precision beyond that. Recalling the number of values I 
conservatively estimated above, and reasoning that the extended experience of 
parenting may have values significantly greater than those for events like breaking a leg 
or attending a joyous wedding, I offer the following figures: 
Personally Transformed Experience: 30 inaccessible values.  Lower bound (for some): - 
100,000 Upper Bound (for some): +100,000  54
 On this proposal, the experiential values associated with what it is like to be a 
parent could possibly be thousands of times more negative or positive than strongly 
valued events (or more! I am happy to defer to experts, actual parents, on this). Now 
recall that discovery values are supposed to be accessible to decision-making. If we are 
able to rationally decide on the basis of discovery values, we are currently able to assign 
them. I confess that I cannot honestly assign values to the discovery of parenthood to 
compete with the range of possible figures above. But I also find it hard to believe that 
anyone could. If so, does that mean that it is always irrational to decide to become a 
parent? 
 More informally, what I am trying to capture above is the fact that things could 
go the wrong way with something like parenting, and you could be stuck in a miserable 
situation. The value of discovering a transformed self in a miserable situation seems like 
it would be small consolation for the person who has to continuously live the misery.  55
!  I am assigning these values from the point of view of the transformed person. This is 54
something that Paul may object to. But her argument for inaccessible values is not strong 
enough to show that a pre-transformed self cannot understand that their transformed self could 
be in a miserable situation. That is what I am trying to convey here. 
!  This is so even when discovery is continuous, as surely it is in parenting. The miserable 55
transformed person may discover that there are ever new ways of being miserable. At best that 
only mitigates the misery. 
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At the end of the day, one still has to be a parent when the value of discovery is 
outweighed. Perhaps my proposed figures unjustifiably stack the deck against discovery 
values. If so, more needs to be said than Paul provides about how discovery values can 
compete with possible transformed values. Discovery does not render irrelevant the 
need to anticipate how badly things could go with a decision.     
 In the absence of more information about how discovery values can compete with 
the possible ranges of inaccessible ones, the strongest response I can think of for the 
discovery theorist at this point is to say that the gravity problem lies in wait for any 
proposed solution to our problem. Furthermore, it is the only solution on the table. How 
else can we deal with inaccessible values other than to ask ourselves how much we value 
rendering them accessible? We can do no better than to work with the only tool we’ve 
got. In the next section, I will propose an alternative. I will argue that it does not fall 
prey to guidance problems and propose a way in which it may deal with the gravity 
problem.  
Another Way: Choosing the Most Worthwhile 
 If you want to make a transformative choice, we have so far ruled out doing so on 
the basis of experiential values, whether cognitively modeled or scientifically 
determined. I have also argued against doing it on the basis of the discovery of those 
values. However, even if you have accepted the arguments against these bases for 
transformational decision making, you may still have a lingering sense that you can 
make such decisions rationally. You might not be able to shake the feeling that, after all, 
of course you know that you strongly prefer parenthood to monkhood or to remaining 
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childless (or visa versa!) and that it would not be irrational to act on that preference. I 
think there is something right about that feeling and I aim to vindicate it in this section.  
 Imagine a forced-choice situation where you have to choose between becoming a 
parent and spending the rest of your life stripping paint. I’m not talking about a painting 
career, where stripping paint is part of the job. And you get to do things besides your 
job. I’m talking about a life devoted to stripping paint, with some time set aside for 
eating, rest, and the other necessities. You may suppose that you can get really good at 
stripping paint. Perhaps you will even develop new techniques for doing it more quickly, 
efficiently, or safely. You can be as playful as you want with it as well, to help fend off 
boredom. You may also suppose that it lends to some larger goal. Perhaps you are 
ridding buildings of toxic paints or preparing them to be repainted by the world’s 
greatest paint team. Why might you, or anyone, prefer parenting to paint-stripping?  
 The answer, I propose, is that many people would prefer parenting to paint-
stripping, even ideal paint-stripping, because it is believed by them to be inherently 
more worthwhile.  It is because they believe that doing things like comforting one’s 56
own child, or helping one’s child learn a valuable life lesson, is simply more worthwhile 
than attaining a new personal best, or even a world record, in the time it takes to strip 
500 square feet of paint.  Being a good parent is more worthwhile than being an ideal 
paint-stripper and so is striving to be the former over the latter. People value being 
!  People often use ‘meaningful’ to describe some of the values I am after here. I like the word 56
better than ‘worthwhile’ but some people think it has more experiential connotations than 
‘worthwhile’. If uses of ‘meaningful’ capture any aspects of intrinsic worth of identities or 
activities that are not captured by ‘worthwhile’, my use of ‘worthwhile’ is intended to cover them 
as well. I will stick with just ‘worthwhile’ for uniformity and simplicity reasons. 
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parents over being paint-strippers independently of the experiential values associated 
with them.   57
 Before commenting further on the consequences of the example, let me make a 
few remarks on the relevant comparisons. First, devoting one’s life to paint-stripping is 
just as much a personally transformative choice as any other that Paul discusses. A life 
that revolved almost exclusively around paint-stripping would be very different from 
one we know and equally hard to imagine, if not more so, as any transformation we 
actually contemplate undertaking. Since it would involve a personal transformation, we 
can say all the same things about it. For example, we may suppose that our core-
preferences could change in such a way that we come to strongly value the experiential 
qualities of being a devoted paint-stripper. Our phenomenological sense of self would 
change, and we would discover much that is novel in expert-paint-stripping-experience. 
My point is that judgments of worthwhileness justify the rationality of people regarding 
transformed preferences for such experiences as warped and contorted, not just merely 
different from their own. Insofar as people could admire the virtuoso paint-stripper, it 
would be under conditions of forced paint-stripping, where the person is making the 
best of her situation.               
 The extremity of the example is only supposed to highlight what I think is a basic 
fact of human evaluation: that we make judgments of inherent worthwhileness which 
!  At one point Paul makes reference to “life satisfaction” and “meaningfulness”, which may or 57
may not be part of what I am advocating for here. But she does seem to compare them to non-
phenomenal factors when she says that such are not under consideration, especially if they do 
not “swamp” experiential values (2014, 73 n. 29). My project can be understood precisely as 
trying to meet this “swamping” problem, which I think unavoidable for any potential solution 
including her own (as my discussion of the gravity problem should show). Additionally, I do not 
think all “external, non-phenomenal factors”, including worthwhileness are moral or ethical 
factors (see more below). But I do consider the examples she uses (environmental impact and 
population control) to be ethical factors.   
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inform our decision making. These sorts of judgments are common place. The 
skateboarding trick itself is cool; the three-point shot itself is impressive; the piano 
playing itself is graceful and masterful; climbing the mountain is itself an achievement. 
We may think of the myriad ways in which human performances can be intrinsically 
valuable as determinants of the value-determinable I am calling worthwhileness.  58
Crucially, people are often clearly motivated by these values. They are motivated by the 
potential to achieve gracefulness, masterfulness, finesse, creativity, expressiveness, and 
so on. Usually, in the pursuit of skills and other valuable activities, people are not 
inhibited by worries over how the associated phenomenology might turn out.  
 Now, I’m not saying that people don’t, much less shouldn’t, worry about the kinds 
of phenomenology that Paul argues are inaccessible. But it would be equally implausible 
to hold that the kinds of judgments I’ve been illustrating are absent from transformative 
decision making. I do not need to claim that such judgments are fully objective, non-
relativistic, or that fully rational choices must agree on what is worthwhile. My point is 
only that we can and do make such judgments and allow our preferences and choices to 
be guided by them.  
 Let me stress that I understand these values of worthwhileness to be non-moral 
or non-ethical. That is, morality’s mandates and prohibitions do not guide in matters of 
worthwhileness. Morality leaves open the possibility of rational disagreement over what 
is worthwhile and to what degree. It also allows rational differences of opinion over how 
much decision making weight to place on values of worthwhileness vis-a-vis other kinds 
!  Thanks to Ned Hall for suggesting this way of putting it. 58
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of values, e.g., experiential ones. It is not part of my project to argue that everyone ought 
to base all major life-decisions solely on judgments of worthwhileness.     
 Before moving to possible worries, let me say that actions and activities are not 
the only things we value in this way. We similarly value the practical identities and 
social roles and statuses we come to inhabit by means of transformation. For some, 
being a public servant of some kind is a worthy thing to be and to aspire to be. 
Relationships themselves are also so valued. A parent-child relationship, to many, is to 
be valued for its own sake. Judgments concerning the inherent worth of identities, 
actions, and relationships should all be part of the transformative decision making 
process. In the next sections I will consider potential problems for these ‘intrinsic worth’ 
values.  
Inaccessibility Redux? 
To be a viable alternative to Paul’s proposal worthwhileness values still need to meet 
some basic constraints of rationality. They cannot be inaccessible, for instance. After all, 
if Paul’s interpretation of our current decision making process is correct, we often base 
our decisions on that which we have no right to. Perhaps we are in the same boat with 
respect to the worthwhile and meaningful. Are such values also inaccessible?  
 Values of inherent worthwhileness cannot be in exactly the same boat as Paul’s 
experiential values. They cannot be inaccessible in the same way because they are not 
values attaching to phenomenal experiences. There may be an analogous problem, 
however, because, as in our usual example, decision-makers have not yet been parents 
nor performed parenting actions. How can they make judgments about whether these 
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things are more worthwhile than being or doing something else? On what basis do they 
do so?  
 This is not the setting to attempt a full-fledged epistemology of judgments of 
worthwhileness. What little I want to say about it here is by way of addressing an 
important response open to the experiential values theorist. The response insists that 
there can be no rationally justified judgments of worthwhileness that are not at least 
partially based in the experience of worthwhileness. I can allow this general principle 
but deny that it gets the experiential values theorist what she needs. What she needs is 
that there can be no rationally justified evaluations of the specific kind of 
worthwhileness attaching to practical identities and actions that are transformative 
from one’s current perspective. I deny this because our powers of generalization and 
projection are much less restricted with respect to values of worthwhileness than with 
respect to experiential values. I argue this by way of noting some crucial differences 
between how we judge worthwhileness and how we judge experiential values.  
 Difference #1: Recognitional Capacities Consider the recognition of incredible 
athletic feats and virtuoso musical performances. One need not have the slightest 
previous experience doing such things oneself to be able to recognize the skill and 
greatness of such acts when we witness them. Likewise, I claim, one need not have been 
a parent to recognize the worthwhileness of certain parental acts. Thus, even if 
internally experiencing the value of worthwhileness as such is necessary for desiring it 
and forming preferences for it, it doesn’t follow that the internal experience of the 
worthwhileness of X is necessary for being able to recognize and prefer the 
worthwhileness of X.  
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 Difference #2: Fineness of Grain Experiential values are much more fine-grained 
than those of worthwhileness. Paul emphasizes the richness and complexity of 
experiential values. And she claims that the cognitive phenomenology involved in the 
worry over loved ones prior to having children cannot be adequately projected to know 
what it is like to worry over one’s own children. In contrast, one need only have 
experiential confirmation that loving familial relationships are worthwhile to prefer lives 
filled with loving familial relationships to ones without them on the basis of 
worthwhileness. More strongly, while parental phenomenology and its value is 
inaccessible to children not themselves parents, the worthwhileness of strong, healthy 
parent-child relationships is not. A child can justifiably infer, I claim, from the 
worthwhileness of her side of the relationship to the worthwhileness of the relationship 
as a whole, and to that of the other side. 
 Difference #3: ‘Theory’-Ladenness In arguing for inaccessibility, Paul usually 
mentions the immediate reactions we have to revelatory experiences and how we cannot 
anticipate them. In addition, the descriptions people offer are simply not up to the task 
of informing us what they are like. It seems as though experiential values are reactively 
formed upon initial encounter. There is no other way for them to be formed. In contrast, 
evaluative judgments of worthwhileness are guided by ‘theory’, understood broadly. We 
are socialized into cultures and sub-cultures full of traditions and judgments about what 
is worthwhile and what is not. Anyone who has been prodded by their parents to pursue 
some extracurricular activities rather than others (e.g., music practice over television), 
or certain career paths rather than others, knows this well. Our judgments of 
worthwhileness are informed by ideals we are raised with--one’s that people can 
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critically engage with. Forming preferences about what is worthwhile is not like initially 
formed taste preferences for chocolate over vanilla.  
 Some first-personal experience of things that are inherently worthwhile may be 
necessary for rationally projecting and generalizing judgments of worthwhileness. But it 
does not follow that one cannot rationally judge the worthwhileness of X, for some X, 
without first-person experience with X. I think the considerations above present a 
plausible case that we can and do make some such judgments rationally.  
What of Cognitive Modeling? 
 Paul’s focus on experiential values depends on an intuitive feature of decision-
making for everyone. Faced with a decision resulting in different and unknown futures, 
we attempt to get as much information about those futures as we can. One natural, even 
instinctive, way to do this is to imaginatively and cognitively model the future, using 
past experience as our guide. Does my alternative position require me to reject that we 
do this? I surely do not want to deny that we engage in such modeling. But do I deny 
that we are justified in doing it or that it contributes anything to our decision making? 
Insofar as cognitive modeling of our potential futures involves modeling the experience 
of our futures and how we would evaluate them, Paul herself has established a weakness 
in our usual method of decision making. And, insofar as our cognitive modeling is aimed 
at accessing future experience, does that demonstrate how little attention we pay to 
values of worthwhileness? After all, one might think that you don’t need to project the 
future to make judgments about something’s worthwhileness.  
 Of course, I need not deny that personally modeling potential futures is involved 
in our decision making to hold that there are additional factors to the process. Factors 
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besides ones based on modeling certainly play into our decisions. But I want to deny 
that modeling the future is only about, or exclusively for the purpose of, accessing 
potential phenomenology. When we model the future, among that which we model are 
objective events. Besides the inherent implausibility of denying this, Paul needs it for 
her own characterization of what we do when we model the future. She thinks the 
experiences we value, or attempt to value, are of objective events, and stipulates that the 
experiences she is interested in must be largely veridical, or reflective of actual states of 
affairs (2014, 11-12). Presumably she would also say that when we attempt to model our 
future phenomenology, we do so in response to what we expect will happen.  
 But imagining objective events does not just call to mind the experience of those 
events. It can also call to mind how much we value those events. And this is precisely 
what I want to claim is one of the things that some people do when imagining 
transformed futures. People imagine the actual actions they will perform in alternative 
futures and ask themselves which ones are inherently more worthwhile. I can imagine 
parenting activities and ask myself how much I value their worthwhileness and whether 
I want that worthwhileness to be a part of my life. There are other important things we 
are trying to do when cognitively modeling alternative futures. But this should be 
enough to deflect any idea that the fact that we use cognitive modeling to guide decision 
making is a threat to the claim that considerations of worthwhileness are also engaged.    
Gravity and Guided Transformation 
 With regard to the problems I raised for discovery values, I think it should be 
evident now that the guidance one does not really arise for the kinds of inherent worth 
values I’ve been advocating. The motivating examples I’ve appealed to illustrate well 
!129
how such judgments usually aim at comparing and discriminating the values of different 
things. Indeed most systems of evaluation aim at doing just that. It is a peculiar feature 
of the discovery value that it cannot do that. But all proposals for dealing with how to 
weigh or balance out values on the other side of transformation must seriously grapple 
with the gravity problem. What sorts of values that we currently have access to could 
possibly help us think about how to deal with inaccessible values that we would have to 
live with if we undergo transformation? I offer a speculative proposal for how values of 
worthwhileness can rise to the occasion. It is based on a feature of the transformative 
process that Paul does not explicitly deny, but also doesn’t seem to take seriously in her 
work thus far. My proposal is based on the idea that the transformative process can be 
thought of more on a model of training oneself to acquire new tastes than on a model of 
accepting one’s initial reactions to new tastes. We may commit to a project of self-
conditioning to value the experiences that accompany what we judge to be most 
worthwhile to do. Before getting to the details, though, let’s recall the nature of the 
gravity problem.  
 For the discovery value theorist, I raised the complaint that you still have to get 
on with the business and responsibilities of parenting once you’ve discovered what it is 
like. If it turns out to be pretty miserable, the thought that: “Well, at least I can say that I 
can keep discovering what it is like to be transformed by parenting” seems like 
inadequate solace. Can the value of worthwhileness offer better consolation to the 
miserable parent? This is the issue my self-conditioning strategy is designed to address.  
 The idea of discovery strongly suggests receptivity and lack of control. One 
discovers what is already there, independently of himself. When we set out to discover 
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something, we want to find out about X, not dictate concerning X. The idea of revelatory 
experience conforms to this model. We want to find out what durian tastes like and how 
we will respond to it: how delicious (or not) we will find it. But these features of 
revelatory experience are quite misleading if used as a complete model for what 
transformation over time, epistemic or personal, is like. This can be seen by considering 
the phenomenon of acquired tastes which I turn to next.  
Revelation and Acquisition 
 Revelatory experiences are not necessarily very informative or psychologically 
determinative. Take the initial taste of wine. There is a sense in which my first taste of 
wine was revelatory (and so epistemically transformative). I can attest that it was new 
and, in many ways (though not all), unlike anything I had ever tasted. It was far more 
different from grape juice than I had expected. Still, my initial experience was under-
informative concerning the taste of wine. Today I know much more about what wine 
tastes like than I did after my first few glasses. Tasting wine is a much richer and 
complex experience for me now than when I first drank it. My epistemic transformation 
due to my initial encounter with wine was real but, in many respects, really negligible. 
To extend the revelation metaphor, it was akin to having a few of the middle books of 
the Bible revealed. Further revelation would bring both additional information and 
more sense-conferring context. Epistemic transformation increased as my experience 
with wine increased. Yet, I don’t recall a revelatory moment when wine became rich and 
complex for me. I only recall my initial encounter with it. Revelatory experiences may be 
the most memorable because of the way our psychology works. But, for the same reason, 
they may also be much less important to understanding how psychological 
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transformation works. This is even more apparent when it comes to evaluation of 
transformed experience.     
 The value I attached to my revelatory encounter with wine was also not a good 
guide to how I would value my later, transformed experience with wine. I greatly 
disliked it the first time I tried it. I enjoy it now. But not enough to put in the effort to be 
able to distinguish all but a few kinds. By contrast, I’ve developed a more ‘refined‘ taste 
for beer and its different varieties, even though I disliked it more than wine the first few 
times I tried it. The psychological transformations I underwent with respect to wine and 
beer were not predictable for me based on the revelatory experiences I had with them. 
Many people report similar experiences. For them, alcoholic beverages are an acquired 
taste. For whatever reason, they were determined to come to enjoy them. And they were 
successful in bringing about this taste-transformation in themselves.   
 Acquired tastes are examples of psychological transformation (both cognitive and 
conative), which are not well understood on the model of initial reactions to epistemic 
revelation. Nor is the  subject’s relation to their own transformation best described 
merely in terms of discovery. Rather, psychological subjects take on commitments to 
come to value experiences in a certain way, training themselves to do so. They help 
guide the formation of their preferences, and actively learn more than revelatory 
experience teaches. Culinary tastes are not the only things people learn to like, of course. 
They learn to like all kinds of music, art, activities, ideas, people, and on and on, that 
would not be predicted from revelatory encounters. Can our ability to actively train our 
preferences for such things serve as a model for deep personal transformation? Can we 
commit to actively becoming the kinds of people that value and enjoy transformed lives 
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with rational expectation of success? If so, we could resist the idea that the experiential 
values of a transformed life simply await our discovery. Instead, we may adopt the 
attitude that, whatever the character of the transformed phenomenology turns out to be, 
we can actively mold our preferences to find them sufficiently agreeable.  
 Of course, we don’t undertake wearying projects of re-training our core 
preferences for the heck of it. We need motivating ideals to do so. My suggestion is that 
ideals to be and do the most worthwhile things can fill such a motivational role. If we 
determine that, say, becoming a parent is the most worthwhile way to go, we may 
commit ourselves to self-conditioning for the sake of acquiring the ability to value the 
experience of being a parent and doing parental things with sufficient satisfaction.   
 An immediate concern for my proposal is whether we can undertake the kinds of 
self-conditioning I am suggesting with any kind of rational expectation of success. 
Certainly, success is not guaranteed and so it is a pressing question how one might 
assess one’s probability of success. That question will have to await another occasion, 
however. I do not have the space to mount a full defense of my proposal here. Let me 
suggest, however, that considerations besides likelihood of success may sometimes be 
more important. For people may rationally want to test and prove the strength of their 
character or resolve to themselves. Attempting to train yourself to ‘acquire a taste‘ for 
what you judge most worthwhile seems precisely like the kind of thing worth testing 
your mettle on, if anything is. Of course, this suggestion also demands further 
development. I only hope to have made the self-conditioning strategy seem like an 
option worth thinking more about.  
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Conclusion   
Transformative experience offers much to philosophical reflection, and Paul’s work on 
its challenges to rational decision making shows how fruitful such reflection can be. Her 
articulation of the problem due to the inaccessibility of values necessary for 
transformative decision making, and proposed solution, illuminate our decision making 
situation. If she is right about the problem, as I think she is, it is both important and 
urgent. I have argued that her solution cannot meet the demands of the problem. In its 
stead, I have argued for a shift in focus to non-experiential values, ones of inherent 
worthwhileness, that can motivate active adaptation to experiential values. There are 
surely problems for this proposal that I have not yet anticipated. But I hope to have 
made the case that it deserves further investigation. 
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